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Abstract

Security is a factor which decides upon the applicability of

distributed applications.

Therefore this thesis deals with security in distributed systems. The complexity of the existing
distributed technologies makes it necessary to reduce the number of distributed technologies
considered in this thesis, i.e. concentrating on: Java, Mobile Agents and CORBA, where only
Java-based mobile agents will be considered.
After a short review of basic

security principles including firewalls, existing security

problems in the above mentioned distributed technologies are analysed. Additional generic
problems in distributed systems are outlined.
Solutions are referring

to two different areas: those regarding security problems with

firewalls and solutions regarding security problems at application level. For most of the
problems different solutions and approaches have been presented.
The solutions at application level are also analysed using criteria which have been defined ir
the first chapter.
A framework for different application types, which should be able to guarantee security ir
four basic scenarios, has been defined in the thesis. These four scenarios use different securit}
mechanisms. Based on the conclusions of the previous work for every scenario a solution ha‘
been presented. The focus lies on the selection and integration of old and new technologies.
In theses scenarios a method to find the weakest element has been defined. This method
which is based on experience, is applied on the Intemet-to-Intranet scenario.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Objectives

The main objectives of this thesis are the following:
•

An overview of security in CORBA, Java, Mobile Agents.

•

The specification of typical security problems.

•

The definition of application types.

•

Security solutions for the defined distributed application types, using the following
distributed technologies: CORBA, Java, Mobile Agents.

1.2 Structure

To achieve the goals, that have been set in the section 1.1, this thesis has been structured into
six parts [figure 1.1].
In Chapter 1 the objectives are defined and the structure of the thesis is outlined. Further a
short introduction about distributed computing and the basics of information security is
given.
Chapter 2 is split into two parts:
•

The first gives an overview about the three main distributed architectures, including
CORBA, Java and Mobile Agents.

•

The second gives an introduction to firewall technology, classical security protocols and
current security facility used in distributed systems.

In Chapter 3 an overview of the security facilities of CORBA, Java and Mobile Agents is
given. After outlining the security problems, a classification into generic and particular
problems is performed.

Introduction

Analysis and Conclusions
The Framework
Solutions for different Application Types
Outlook and Future Research

Figure 1.1; The Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 4 contains the implementation part and is structured into two parts: the first part is
where solutions using firewalls are discussed and the second part is where solutions at
application level are discussed. While the first part concentrates on communication security,
the second one concentrates on object level seeurity.
In Chapter 5, the major application types are defined. Additionally, for a better description of
solutions a security framework is defined. After the introduction of
solutions, advantages and disadvantages are discussed.
The thesis finishes with an outlook and possible future research activities.

the recommended

1.3 Distributed Computing

In the mid 1980s dramatic changes in information technology took place. The fall of the
centralised mainframe was accompanied by the rise of networked workstations[Bur98].
Dramatic revolution in mass produced electronic hardware led to computing devices on every
desktop. These would soon be interconnected together into networks of computers. This was
then followed by the challenge to develop the software for a distributed infrastructure.

1.3.1

Definition

Distributed computing is a type of computing in which different entities comprising an
application can be located on different computers connected to a network [WebOO]. Once
objects have been used in applications, it was a matter of course to develop systems that allow
these objects to be physically located on different computers. The use of object oriented
techniques in distributed systems, has introduced the distributed object computing term.
The World Wide Web (WWW) is accelerating the trend toward distributed computing. As
Sun Microsystems predicted, “ The network is the computer”.

1.3.2

Advantages

The development of distributed systems has been accelerated by the following factors:
•

Better information and resource sharing,

•

More computing power to the end-user,

•

Higher grade of scalability, which enables a easier expansion of the system,

•

Increases reliability through redundancy.
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•

Due to the use of object oriented implementation techniques and reuse techniques, these
systems are cheaper than the traditional systems.

1.3.3

Disadvantages

On the other side certain disadvantages can not be denied. Due to a increasing complexity of
the distributed systems:
•

it is harder to manage them and

•

it is harder to secure them.

This last disadvantage was one of the reasons of writing this thesis.

1.4 Information Security

Information security contains the concepts, techniques, technical measures, and administrative
measures used to protect information assets from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorised
acquisition, damage, disclosure, manipulation, modification, loss, or use [McD94]. It is the
ability of a system to manage, protect, and distribute sensitive information.
The main security goals in distributed systems have been defined by different organisation.
The following security goals can be found in the ISO-7498-2 standard as well as in the OMGs
security goal definition:

•

Authentication checks the authenticity of the communication partners and data sources
and determines whether the person or agent trying to access information should be
allowed access or not. The verification of the identity of a user, agent or other entity in a
computer system is often a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in a system.

11

“Authentication is the most important of the security services, because all other security
services depend upon it some extent”[For94j.
•

Access control guarantees that access to local and remote resources will take place after
the authorisation has occurred.

•

Confidentiality is the prevention from the unauthorised disclosure of information
[BAR95]. The protection of the content of a message during communication from other
entities is usually done using encryption.

•

Integrity is the degree to which a system or component prevents unauthorised access to,
or modification of, computer programs or data [IEE90]. It is the ability of verify that the
message has not been tampered with. Usually, this is realised using checksums and hashfunctions.

•

Accountability, which means that users are accountable for their security-relevant
actions. Non-repudiation is a particular case. Non-repudiation is the assurance that the
initiator of a certain transaction can not later claim that it did not initiated or participated
in the transaction. Using encryption, hash-functions and digital signatures together with
verifying information usually does this.

•

Availability, states that the use of the system cannot be maliciously denied to authorised
users.

Additionally, the provision of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that uses audit trails is
useful. Even if certain parts of the security system break down, the IDS should be able to
indicate the presence of a possible attacker [ABE96].
To achieve these aims the use of security policies at object level is recommended.
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Chapter 2 Distributed Architectures and Security Principles

2.1 Distributed Architectures

The next generation of networks (Intranets, Internet...) will be based on distributed object
technology. Taking into consideration all the necessary requirements, at least three
organisations - the Object Management Group (OMG), Sun and Microsoft — have proposed
different architectures. While Sun has developed the Java language with a corresponding run
time environment*, Microsoft developed the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).
Additionally, the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) has defined

an

Architecture for Intelligent Mobile Agents. After a longer period of time the OMG defined a
well thought out Object Management Architecture (OMA) containing the Common Object
Request Broker Architecture (CORBA).
The

OMG was founded 1989 and promotes the theory and practice of object oriented

technology in software development. The OMG is an international organisation supported by
over 750 members.
Due to the complexity of these architectures, only the CORBA model, Java model and the
Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) Architecture will be presented here.

2.1.1 The Object Model

The Object Model is based on the concept of objects, which are combining behaviour and
attributes into a single entity. An object can only be manipulated using the operations defined
for that object. Attributes contain data. There are four basic concepts in this model:

‘ Sun has also defined the Remote Method Invocation Method (not discussed here).
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1. Abstraction - Abstract objects can be used to group objects. These abstract objects have
no instances.
2. Inheritance - Allows to pass along the capabilities of one object to another object
implying a certain specialisation. Optional restrictions, e.g. private / protected classes or
member of classes are available.
3. Encapsulation - Allows the hiding of object implementations in complex structures.
Furthermore, modifications of an object can be done by inheriting one object to another.
While new attributes can be added, the operations can be redefined.
4. Polymorphism - Polymorphism is the ability

to substitute

objects

with matching

interfaces for one another at run-time.
The object oriented model is often used in distributed systems, e.g. CORE A compliant
architectures, object oriented languages like Java, or mobile agent systems. But the OMG
object oriented model is abstract, while any implemented model is concrete. In the OMA it
forms the basics of distributed object computing, for further details see [OMA95].
This concept allows the definition of a model, based on the real world. It allows the use of
object oriented design techniques in creating a new system, where extensions of the model are
easily possible. Further the reuse of software is possible.

14

2.1.2 The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA)

2.1.2.1 The Object Management Architecture Reference Model

Description

The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) defines a distributed object
oriented

architecture for applications. CORBA is a de facto standard, which has been

published by the Object Management Group (OMG).
The Object Management Architecture (OMA) provides the conceptual infrastructure upon
which all OMG specification are based, including CORBA. The OMA Reference Model
provides possible interactions between the objects involved in the architecture.

Application
Interfaces

1
I

Domain
Interfaces

1
1

> Application
specific
components

Object Request Broker

V System
^ specific
components

Figure 2.1: The OMA Reference Model

The OMA Reference Model contain application specific and system speeific components, see
figure 2.1. The main parts of the reference model are:
•

the Object Request Broker,
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•

Object Services,

•

Common Interfaces,

•

Application Interfaces,

•

Domain Interfaces.

The Object Request Broker

The ORB enables objects to transparently send and receive requests and responses in a
distributed environment. It is the foundation for building applications from distributed objects
and for interoperability between applications in hetero- and homogeneous environments.
[ORB99]
The Object Request Broker allows applications objects to interact without the knowledge
where other application objects are on the network. Only the broker knows where the client or
server is located. The ORB hides: object location, object implementation, object execution
state and object communication mechanism.
While the ORB should be kept as simple as possible, the functionality should push as much as
possible functionality to other OMA components such as

Object Services and Common

Facilities.

The Object Services

The Object Services are a collection of services (interfaces and objects) that support basic
functions for using and implementing objects. Services are necessary to construct any
distributed application and provide a universal basis for application interoperability. Up to
now the following services have been defined: Naming Service, Event Service, Persistent
Object Service, Life Cycle Service, Concurrency Control Service, Extemalisation Service,
16

Relationship Service, Transaction Service, Query Service, Licensing Service, Property
Service, Time Service, Trading Service, Collections Service, and Security Service.
Since most of these services are not relevant for this work, they will not be described here.
We will only concentrate on the security service, which will be described in section 3.1. For
further information on one of the above mentioned services, see [OSV98].

The Common Facilities

The Common Facilities are a collection of services that many applications may share, but
which are not as fundamental as the Object Services. As a common facility, we can mention
the Mobile Agent Facilities.
Facilities can be divided into two major categories:
•

Horizontal Facilities are used directly by the most systems. They provide basic
capabilities such as

Information Management, System Management, Document

Management.
•

Vertical Facilities are specialised components, which support domain-specific tasks that
are associated with vertical market segments.

More Information about other Common Facilities can be found in [OCF98].

The Application Interfaces (Objects)

Application Interfaces (Objects) are developed specifically for a given application, usually by
a single vendor. They integrate all of the other components and provide some additional
capabilities not commercially available. These interfaces are not standardised by the OMG.

17

The Domain Interface

Domain Interfaces fill roles
oriented

towards

similar to Object Services and Common Facilities, but are

specific application domains, such as Electronic Commerce or

Manufacturing.

2.1.2.2 CORBA - The Architecture

Description

CORBA can be conceptualised as a communication bus for client-server objects [Seg99].
Also specialised software components, that meet

specific enterprise information system

requirements, can be fit on the bus.
The main design goal of CORBA is that clients and objects be decoupled sufficiently that it
is possible to write

them in different languages and run them on

completely different

operating systems and computer hardware architectures [CHI98].

Client

Implementation
Repository

Interface
Repository

Dynamic

Client

ORB

Invocation

Stubs

Interface

Implementation
Skeleton

Object Request Broker

Figure 2.2.: The Common Object Request Broker Architecture

Object
Adapter

J

Middleware is software that resides between the application and the operating system. As
middleware handles the low-level details, it releases application developers from this part and
keeps the complexity of the application software development low. CORBA is middleware
and therefore is platform, language and vendor independent.
The basic parts of CORBA 2.0 are:
•

the Object Request Broker (ORB),

•

the Interface Definition Language (IDL),

•

the Client Stub and Server Skeleton,

•

the Interface Repository and the Implementation Repository,

•

the Object Adapter (OA),

•

Invocations.

The ORB

The Object Request Broker is the core of the Common Object Request Broker Architecture. A
short description can be found in 2.2.1.2. For further information see [ORB99].

The Interface Definition Language (IDL)

Before a client can make requests to an object, it must know

the types of operations

supported by the object. Therefore the object’s interface specifies the operations and types
that are supported by the object.
Interfaces must be specified in the CORBA standard Interface Definition Language (IDL)
and correspond to a class, which contains attributes and operations.
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IDL is a strongly typed, platform independent and declarative language, that is programming
language independent, i.e. separates the interface definition from the object implementation. It
hides the platform dependent implementation details from other components in the system.
Language mapping determines how the IDL features are mapped to the facilities of a given
programming language, e.g. Java, C++.

Interface definition is usually compiled using a IDL-compiler, which generates stub- and
skeleton code. The skeleton code gets linked to the server object implementation.

Stubs & Skeletons

A stub is a mechanisms that creates and issues requests on behalf of a client. Essentially, it is
a proxy for the actual target object [LAN97]. A proxy is an object used locally instead of a
server object, which is located in another domain, see figure 2.3 . This proxy is marshalling
methods and parameters to be transmitted via the ORB.

Host

Host

The skeleton is a mechanism that delivers requests to the target object implementation.

Cork Institute of Technology
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The Interface Repository

The Interface Repository (IR) provides persistent objects that represent the IDL information
in a form available at the run-time. A client application can use information from the IR to
invoke a method of an object whose interface was not known when the application was
compiled, this is called dynamic invocation.

The Implementation Repository

Descriptions of object implementations are maintained as objects in the Implementation
Repository. The Implementation Repository contains information that allows the ORB to:
•

locate on object,

•

determine the launch permissions of an implemented object,

•

determine the access permissions of objects and

•

activate implementations of objects.

Concluding, the Implementation Repository is a common place to store

additional

information associated with implementations of objects, e.g. debugging information.

The Object Adapter

An Object Adapter (OA) is responsible for managing server objects and related object
references. It uses the Implementation Repository:
•

to generate Interoperable References,

•

to register objects,

•

to activate/deactivate an object implementation,
21

/S

•

to launch a command,

•

to secure interactions.

The Object Adapter is an interposed object that uses delegation to allow a caller to invoke
requests on an object, even though the caller does not know the object’s true interface
[LAN97]. The most important OA is the Basic Object Adapter (BOA), for details see
[ORB99].

Invocations

There are two basic invocation types:
•

static invocations, where stubs and skeletons are built directly into the client and server
object.

•

dynamic invocations, where the stub and skeleton are of a generic type.

Theses invocations are supported by the following two interfaces:
•

The Dynamic Invocation Interface (DII), which provides dynamic client request
invocation.

•

The Dynamic Skeleton Interface (DSI), which provides dynamic dispatch to (server)
objects.

There are different method invocations: synchronous, one-way / poll, one-way / callback,
one-way / event service, for details see [Seg99].

2.1.2.3 The ORB Intercommunication Model

The CORBA standard guarantees interoperability between ORB implementations as well as
between applications built with different ORBs. It specifies the interoperable object reference
(lOR), which can be passed across different ORB implementations.
22

The Interoperable Object Reference (lOR) allows

the object implementation

to publish

information that allow clients to find and forward requests to ORBs. An object reference is
automatically created when an object is created. It cannot be modified by the client. The lOR
of a new created object will differ from the lOR of an old object initialisation, since it
contains, among other things, a “pointer” to the object, that changes at every object
initialisation.
CORBA 2.0 general ORB interoperability architecture provides:
•

Direct ORB-to-ORB interoperability, which is possible when the involved ORB’s are
located in the same domain (they understand the same ORB’s and share the same security
information).

•

Bridge-based interoperability, when ORB’s in different domains must communicate.
Bridges map ORB-specific information from one domain to another.

The ORB intercommunication architecture is based on the General Inter-ORB Protocol
(GIOP), which specifies syntax and a set of message formats for ORB interoperation over
any transport layer.
The GIOP defines a Common Data Representation (CDR) for all basic IDL types and seven
basic

request formats that cover all kind of interactions between the

implementation.

Figure 2.4: Relationship between GIOP and HOP
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client and object

The Internet Inter-ORB Protocol (HOP) defines GIOP message exchange over TCP/IP
networks. HOP is the wire level protocol used for the Internet, see figure 2.4. Environmentspecific Inter-ORB Protocols (ESIOP) are built for special situations, when a distributed
computing architecture already exists, e.g. in an DCE environment.

2.1.2.4 How does the CORBA works

Below a simplified client - server system, using a CORBA compliant architecture, is
described.

Figure 2.5: How does a CORBA Client - Server System works [GOL98]

The functionality of a ORB is typically implemented in three distinct components:
•

a library, that is linked to each client,

•

a library, that is linked to each server,

•

an activation daemon - ensuring that CORBA servers are launched properly and clients
can make connections to the server.
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A client does not need to be aware of:
the communication mechanism,
object activation,
object implementation,
object location.
For a simplified way how CORE A works, see figure 2.5: During the initial binding phase, the
client connects to the activation component or a naming service^ (1,2). After that, the target
interoperable object reference (lOR) is looked up in the Implementation Repository (3). If the
target (server) object is not already running it is launched (4,5). The target lOR is then passed
to the client-side ORB library (6). Where the client invokes target-side methods through the
object code stub (7,8). The ORB library connects transparently to the target ORB library (9).
The target ORB library mediates the request to the target object through the target skeleton
code (10,11). Then the reply is sent back the chain 11 to 7.
After that, the communication occurs direct between the client and the server objects.

At the intercommunication model level the following things happen:
After a client request, the interface stub calls the ORB to transform the language specific
operation call into a language, operating system and hardware independent Generic InterORB Protocol (GIOP) Request. The GIOP Request is passed to the HOP, where it is packed
into a TCP/IP-packet with TCP host and IlOP-port. The packet is transmitted to the target
host, where the GIOP is unpacked in a similar way and forwarded to the target server object.

^ The naming service provides the ability to bind a name to an object relative to a naming context. In
fact it is similar to the domain name service. For a certain object name it delivers the appendant lOR.
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2.1.3 Java

" Security is a key issue." - Sun Microsystems

2.1.3.1 Aims and use

Java is a object oriented programming language, which has been developed

by James

Gosling and his colleagues at Sun Microsystems Inc. Implementation on different platforms
in distributed, heterogeneously systems was one of the principal goals.
The main aim was the development of a little, simple, secure, robust and portable interpreting
language.
Java is used in simple and distributed applications. The following three scenarios are usual
[Spe96]:
Developing client server application for the Intranet,
Information distribution / data access.
Secure online transactions [Par96].

2.1.3.2. Types of Java Programs

Using Java there are at least three possibilities of executing programs:
the applet: Java applets are little programs, which can be integrated into HTML web sites
and can be executed by web browsers. Using a compiler, the source code of an applet can
be converted into byte code. The byte code consists of a list of instructions, which looks
like machine code, but which is independent of the processor used. The applet is stored in
byte code format on the server. Any user can request the applet using an uniform resource
locator (URL). Before an applet can be executed, all the Java classes, that are necessary,
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must be downloaded in byte code format from the server [fig.2.6]. Here during this
process, the byte code will be checked by the bytecode verifier, by the bytecode loader
and by the security-manager, see the “Security in Java” section.
Using the old JDK 1.* classes, an applet executed in a Netscape-browser can only access
the allocated system resources. The access to external system resources is usually not
possible^.
Applets can only set up links to the server, from which it has been downloaded^.

Web browser

Web server

Java program

URL Looku

I
Program in
bytecode

Applet Code
Java Virtual
Machine

Compiler

L

Figure 2.6: Using Applets

Another possibility is the communication between applets, that are located on the same
HTML site.
There is no possibility to load and execute libraries and programs in native code using all
JDK versions.
the servlet: The servlet is the server-side version of an applet. Usually Java applets are
intended for running as a client, while to access databases these programs need to run on a
server. This solution, based on Java technology, can be executed more quickly than

Gaining access to protected data and external resources was possible, see [Pri96].
During DNS attacks, links to other servers are available.
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Common Gateway Interface (CGI) applications. Each user request is invoked as a thread
in a single daemon process, rather than causing a separate program process to be created.
As an example, we can look at the JavaServerTM product family, which provides servers
for running one or more services, such as FTP, DHCP, or SMTP. In this case servlets are
modules that run inside request/response-oriented services and extend them in some
manner, see fig. 2.7. A servlet can extend the capabilities of the HTTP service by taking
the data, that a client entered in an HTML order-entry form and applying the business
logic used to update a company's order database. A servlet can call on other services and
servlets to satisfy a request, see [Srv97].

Server
ServiceiHTTP Service:ftp
Servlet

Servlet

Servlet

Servlet

Figure 2.7: Servlets

the application: Java applications are programs, which can be executed independently
from HTML sites. They have to be translated with a compiler and need an Java interpreter
for execution. Applications can access every local resource and can establish connections
to any other servers.
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Figure 2.8: Java Application

2.1.3.3 The Java Architecture

Over the last years the security architecture of Java has been continuously developed. The aim
of creating a secure architecture has been finalised in the new brand version JDK 1.2.
The new JDK 1.2, released at the end of the year 1998, brought major changes in the security
concept [fig. 2.9]. This new enterprise security model gives administrators and developers
flexible and fine-grained control over applets, servlets and applications. It offers for the user,
groups and application elements a policy based, configurable and extensible access control
model. Applets are no longer confined to the sandbox model. Now it is possible to define the
level of interoperation with local resources that is required and securely take advantage of
native resources.
Sun has separated the policy expressions from the actual runtime code that implements the
security policy, making it security policy neutral.
The possibility of establishing protection domains is a new concept. Capturing permission
semantics in application definable objects, makes it easier to add resources and permissions.
A new facility is the ability to locate security requirements down to the lowest application
level, i.e. at the distributed object level. This now enables the management of security
attributes down to the object level. The guarded object concept is an example of a solution to
securitv at this level.
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local code or remote code (signed or unsigned)

JVM

Other resources (network, files...)

Figure 2.9: The JDK 1.2 Model

The existence of X.509 v3 standard certificate interfaces extends the code signing facilities.
JDK 1.2 has a plug-in architecture which enables the inclusion of additional security
mechanisms.
The existing Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) can be expanded with Java Cryptography
Extensions (JCE 1.2), which provides additional security controls (Secure Socket Layer,
Crypto APIs, key operations).
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2.1.4

Mobile Agent System

2.1.4.1 Introduction and Motivation

Mobile agents are agents who roam the Intra-, Extra- or Internet on behalf of their users
fulfilling tasks for them like purchasing items or negotiating certain deals for them. In order to
be able to live on a host, they need a predefined environment, in which they can survive. This
environment must support them and be able to execute them. This is the basic idea of an agent
platform.
At first glance, this technology appears to have a large application potential. Unfortunately
most applications so far are either not able to survive real-world applications, or they are only
implemented in restricted localized areas. In parallel, the agent research community still faces
the unsolved problem of finding an application for mobile agents, to justify their preferred use
compared to traditional technologies, like client/server. These two problems are closely linked
to each other: The true potential of agency, especially mobile agency lies in the autonomy of
the single problem-solving agent.
Only if every single agent is able to decide what action to perform and where to go will the
true metaphor of delegation be fulfilled. The requirements, which must be provided for
realizing such a vision, are:
•

the realization of autonomy in each released (mobile) agent,

•

the support of a world wide network of agent platforms, enabling agents to migrate back
and forward between them without putting borders to the agents like this is done in local
applications and,

•

the underlying security concept which would be necessary in such an open world where
agents and platforms were freely accessible and where free communication between all
involved parties would be possible.
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These requirements suggest the following supporting abilities and problems:
•

Real autonomy implies a minimum of intelligence, which is necessary to be able to infer
decisions and to be able to learn from mistakes or experiences. In traditional Artificial
Intelligence (AI) implementations, the following rule can be observed: the more
intelligent agents become, the larger and slower they become. Obviously, this contradicts
the development of autonomous mobile agents, because mobile agents should be small
objects moving quickly through a predefined network.

•

A concept is needed for bridging all agent platforms and enabling migration for agents
between the platforms. This was one of the motivations for the FIPA-Standard [FSP97].
The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents’ (FIPA) purpose is to promote the success
of emerging agent-based applications, services and equipment by providing an
international standard vendors can follow.

•

In combination with the OMG-Mobile Agent System Interoperability Facility (MASIF)
standard proposal [MAS97] a large network can be envisioned. For linking proprietary
agent platforms with different proprietary platforms or standardized platforms a concept is
proposed in [HWM99] in order to extend this global agent network.

•

Learning agents which acquire knowledge by perceiving their environment carry
knowledge structures which can be very interesting for other agents or hosts. Therefore,
security concepts are necessary which do not only code the acquired knowledge but also
enable their invocation at the same time, so that the agent can use it.
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2.1.2.4 Intelligent Mobile Agents

Mobile Agents and Agent Platforms

The term “agent” has become a widely used term, thus providing an acceptable definition is
difficult. Our definition is given at length in [DHH99] and can be summarized as follows: An
agent is a system, which shows behaviour in a manner, which produces the image of it being
alive. Mobile Agents are a subclass of agents and require agent platforms, which support the
migration of agents from one platform to the other. An extended description of mobile agents
and mobile agent platforms can be found in [HWM99].

Intelligence

Intelligence is the computational part of one's ability to achieve goals in the world. Various
kinds and degrees of intelligence occur in people, many animals and some machines. So how
can intelligence be incorporated into machines? Usually intelligent (adaptive) behavior can be
performed with two (three) components:
1. A type of structure which is able to represent a set of functions which rule the behavior of
a system. This can be a neural network, a fuzzy logic base or a set of decision trees.
2. An abstract machine which holds current data and performs actions on the structure with
the aid of this data. This can be an inferring machine of any kind, i.e. a deduction
machines in rule based systems, fuzzy logic inferring components, etc.
3. Intelligent agents need at least to incorporate these two components. In order to allow the
agents to learn, they additionally need to hold techniques for acquiring and adapting the
above mentioned structures themselves. Here decision tree induction, genetic algorithms,
Ockham’s razor for various tasks can be mentioned.
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Communication

Mobile intelligent agents are a subdivision of the field of distributed AI. In order to solve
problems using a set of intelligent mobile components, communication between these
components is absolutely necessary. Therefore, a standard and a de facto standard have been
created

for

agent-to-agent-communication:

FIFA-Agent

Command

Language

(ACL)/Semantic Language (SL) and Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language
(KQML)/Knowledge Interchange Formalism (KIF). The basic concept of these languages is
the generation and parsing of a protocol-like frame in the actual language (KQML or FIPAACL) which includes statements in a so-called content language (KIF or SL). The content
language can be freely chosen, though it usually represents some kind of first, predicate logic
language.
Both languages are based on speech act theory, which states that individual communications
can be reduced to one of a small number of primitive speech, or more generally,
communicative acts, which shape the basic meaning of that communication. Syntactically,
KQML's syntax is Lisp: each message is an s-expression and uses a core of Lisp-like rules.
Some extensions are added to allow for the encoding of content in arbitrary other notations.
FIFA-ACL adopts a very similar syntax, including the form of messages and message
parameters. Both languages can be challenged in the compactness of their encoding.

2.1.4.3 The FIFA Approach

The Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIFA) is an organisation, which is doing
normative work in the agent area. FIFA does not claim identical implementations of mobile
agent systems (MAS), but it claims to standardise interfaces.
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The components of FIFA compliant agent systems and their interoperability are represented in
figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.10: Agent Platform Security Management Interoperability

The Agent Platform Security Manager (APSM) implements the basic security model. It
communicates using the Agent Communication Language (ACL).
The Agent Management System (AMS) is an agent, which manages creation, deletion,
suspension, resumption, authentication and migration of agents on the agent platform and
provides white pages directory service for all agents resident on an agent platform.
The Agent Communication Channel (ACC) is an agent that uses information provided by the
AMS to route messages between agents within the platform and to agents resident on other
platforms.
The Directory Facilitator (DF) is an agent that provides a yellow pages directory service for
agents. It stores description of agents and the services they offer.
The ACC and AMS can register with a DF.
Up to the writing of this part, there was no implementation of a FIPA-compliant agent system.
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Security is the key factor, which will decide upon the applicability of this new technology.
Like Chavez stated in 1997, in order for these agents to be widely accepted, it is crucial that
the agent’s behaviour can easily be understood and controlled by the user“.
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2.2 Security Principles
2.2.1 Firewall Systems
2.2.1.1 Introduction

Nowadays, a huge amount of information is stored in our networks. It has never been
so easy for intruders to gain access to this information.
Up to 98 % of the attacks remain undetected.

In Computerwoche [Cw98] it has been stated

that from 500 questioned users 73% admit that their system had been attacked by hackers and
about 18% do not know if they had been attacked.
The result of another research study [Gar97]

showed

questioned were very anxious about the security

of

that
their

75 %

of the

networks.

companies

100 % of the

companies questioned were working with firewall technologies, whereas 30 %

are

planning to improve their firewall systems but 40 % have no defined strategy for combating
security risks.

2.2.1.2 Security Policies

A general security policy contains the security requirements of the enterprise. Every new
security system should translate a security policy into reality, depending on the existing
requirements.
Based on this policy, one can determine the security requirements of an entire network and
define a network security policy. This can be divided further into sub-network policies.
The last step in this hierarchy will be the policy of the active security components
in our network, i.e. the firewall security policy, which contains the security requirements of
the

firewall

system. This

is mapped on rules, which are needed to guarantee the

security of the protected network.
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A security policy can be defined to include the following three aspects:
Aim
Textbook
\/
Security and Organisational Concept
Present Condition / State
Requirements
Analysis of the System
Risk Analysis
Recomended Security Measures

Operational System
Implementation
Persistent Monitoring

Figure 2.10: Security Policy Cycle

The cycle [Gru96] shown in figure 2.10. outlines the dynamic characteristics of such a
security policy. A firewall system can only exist as part of a security solution, it cannot form
a solution in itself.

2.2.1.3 Definition and Goals

Firewall Systems represent

a common point of trust between

different

networks.

Traffic between the internal and the external networks must pass the firewall system, but
all traffic that has not been authorised by the local security strategy, is blocked.

Firewall systems consist of firewall components. The main firewall components [Poh97]
are:
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Active components, which operate with the communication between the secured and
the unsecured network. Active components can be classified as: packet filters and
application gateways.
Security Management Components, which are needed for their administrations.

The goals of firewall systems have formed the topics for many discussions [Poh97] over the
years. The most important goals are:
access control at different levels within the system (network level, user level),
control at the application layer,
user rights administration,
isolation of certain services,
proof backup and analysis of the log,
alarm facilities,
concealment of the structure of the internal network,
structuring networks, defining security domains with different security necessities,
confidentiality,
resistance against attacks. There must be possibilities for accounting and Network
Address Translations (NAT).

The desired architecture of an active firewall component can be inferred from the goals of
the firewall systems. A good proposal for an active firewall component architecture is
given by N. Pohlmann [Poh97]. Such an architecture should have a modular structure
and include:
* the connecting module,
* the authentication module,
* the analysing module,
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• the set of rules,
• the decision module,
• the log module,
• the computing module and
• the firewall protection modules.

2.2.1.4 Criteria to Select a Firewall System

In practise, not all the goals unfortunately can be fulfilled by the available products.
Criteria to select a firewall product are needed. The most important selection criteria are:
• the security of the firewall platform,
• simplicity of administration,
• transparency of use of Internet services to increase the acceptance,
• address translation,
• server security,
• authentication for external users,
• use of encrypting systems,
• log and alarm facilities.

To be able to select the right firewall product, that fits into the security policy, it is useful to
understand

how

the active firewall components work and what advantages or

disadvantages they have.
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2.2.1.5 Firewall Components

Packet Filter

Packet filters represent the simplest category of firewall components. They analyse
packets at the network layer (ISO/OSI layer 3) and the transport layer (ISO/OSI layer 4).
If the packet, when tested, matches the defined rules, then the packets will be forwarded
between the defined interfaces.
In testing a packet the following information is used:
• the interface on which the packet has been received.
• at the network layer, the protocol type (i.e., IP, ICMP..) and the source and destination
address.
• at the transport layer, the protocol type (i.e., TCP,UDP) and the source and destination
port

numbers,

which identify services (like Telnet, FTP, HTTP...). This

kind of

filtering is sometimes called Service Dependant Filtering.
• timestamping: to determine if a packet has been transmitted during a defined period of
time[Poh97], so preventing a retransmit or a “man in the middle“ attack.

Figure 2.11: Packet Filter (Screening Router) with the Analysed Layers
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Packet filters have
authentication),

many advantages:

they are transparent

(with the exception of

it is often simple to include extensions for new protocols and new

services. Since they have low complexity and the operation time is low therefore they have
high performance.
The main disadvantage

is that data above the transport

layer

is not analysed,

consequently there is no security for the application layer. The structure of the secured
network cannot be concealed. Logging of communication is possible only up to layer 4.
Packet filters can be incorporated into routers or implemented as a dedicated firewall
component. Routers with packet filter facilities are cheap firewall components, but they
have many disadvantages. Usually they do not have log and alarm facilities, and there are
missing security services to prevent attacks. With the use of packet filtering facilities
performance will decrease significantly, because every single packet has to be checked.
Packet filters, as dedicated firewall components, fulfil the design criteria for active
firewall elements [Poh97]. This kind of active firewall component can be managed by a
separate security component.
The price of a firewall component is a disadvantage. Firewall

components are more

expensive than router software updates. They decrease the availability of services in our
network.
Stateful inspection (smart filtering, adaptive screening) are terms that stand for packet
filters

with the ability

to

analyse

the communication on

the

higher layers. A

disadvantage of stateful inspection is that it is highly complex and has no decoupled services.
The application gateway concept described in the next section offers a better solution.
Usually, packet filters are used as extensions for security solutions. They can be used for
smaller networks with fewer security requirements.
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As long as we do not allow any access from the Internet to the Intranet, this type of
firewall component offers basic protection.

Application Gateway

Application gateways are necessary when we have a high security demand. They work on
the

application layer and

analyse the connections between the external and internal

networks. Also they decouple networks on a logical and physical level.
Proxies are used to create application gateways. Proxy services interacts with the client
application on behalf of the real server. The real server remains concealed from the client. A
proxy is a software component that is responsible for a certain service. In order to prohibit a
certain service, the associated proxy on the application gateway has to be stopped.
The host, on which the proxies are installed, has to be specially protected. Such a host is
known as a bastion host. There are two kind of proxies: application level proxies and
generic proxies, also called circuit level proxies.

Figure 2.12: The Structure of an Application Gateway
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Application level proxies provide analysis and log facilities for the application layer. For
every service we need a separate application level proxy.
If for certain services there are no application level proxies available, generic proxies can be
used. Generic proxies are applicable for many services and protocols and offer a framework
for adapted proxies.
Application gateways offer many advantages:
• the decoupling of services by proxies can provide the system with a high degree of
security,
• services can be handled very simply, they can be switched on or off,
• they can offer additional security services, like encryption facilities, or other facilities
which allow the user to react to possible upcoming security breaches,
• simple accounting facilities,
• concealment of the internal network structure, using network address translation,
• challenge-response authorisation is possible,
• control of behaviour patterns .
The flexibility of application level proxies is one of the few disadvantages of application
gateways,

as every new service needs a new proxy. Generic proxies do not have this

problem.

In the case of user oriented services users first have to identify or authorise

themselves before a transparent connection is set up.
Application gateways are slower in performance than packet filters and are more expensive.

Security Management Component

The

security

components
security

management

component

defines

the

rules

for the active firewall

and evaluates the relevant logged security data. The computer on which the

management

component

is running must be resistant against attacks. A
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security breach could result in a deactivation of the active firewall component via the
attacked security management component.
The security management should offer at least the following mechanisms:
• identification and authentication,
• auditing facilities,
• encryption of relevant data,
• task management and distribution.
The integration of our firewall security policy into our network security policy should be
fulfilled by integrating the security management within a network management system.

2.2.1.6 Comparing Concepts

Performance and security are two interdependent concepts, which are also dependent on the
complexity of the tasks to be executed.
Performance Complexity

Security
A

Application Layer

Costs

Application Gateway

Transport Layer
Network Layer

Packet Filter

Figure 2.13: The Dependency between Security, Performance, Complexity and Costs

Packet filters offer a lower degree of security than application gateways. The higher the
analysed layer,

the

higher

the

degree

of security. The complexity is directly

proportional to the degree of security and inverse proportional to the performance of the
firewall components. Usually packet filtering components are cheaper than application
gateway components.
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2.2.2 Classical Security Protocols

The process during which cleartext (plaintext) is transformed into ciphertext using a key is
called encryption. The inverse process is called decryption. A detailed definition can be found
in the ISO 7498-2 standard.
During this section we will use the following notation:
• P or m for plaintext
• C or c for ciphertext
• E for encryption functions
• D for decryption functions
• Used keys are represented lower-sized, e.g.

Dk (C)

is the plaintext resulted from the

decryption of the cyphertext C with the decrypting function D with key K.
Key K

ciphertext C

r
w

plaintext P

Decryption D

Figure 2.14: Asymmetric Encryption

An algorithm together with the set of all possible plaintexts, ciphertexts and keys represents a

cryptosystem.
There are two basic types of keys:
• secret keys - which are kept secret and are used by symmetric, asymmetric and hybrid
algorithms
• public keys - which are made public and are used by asymmetric and hybrid algorithms.
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Cryptanalysis is the art and the science, that makes it possible to extract plaintext from a
ciphertext without knowing the key.
A basic premise of cryptanalysis has been defined in the 19^*^ century by A.Kerckhoff:
The security of a cryptosystem should not be based on keeping the algorithm secure.
The best cryptographic algorithms have not been kept secret. The secret must rely
completely in the key.
Details about the different types of cryptanalytical attacks can be found in my diploma thesis
[Dip96] and in [Sch96].
An algorithm is considered to be secure if:
1. the financial effort to break the algorithm is greater than the value of the encrypted data,
2. the amount of time necessary to break the algorithm is greater than the amount of time
during which the data must be kept secure.
Not only the used cryptographic algorithms, but also the used protocols and

the whole

cryptosystem must be secure.
A perfect (secure) cryptosystem would be a system, where no information about the plaintext
can be extracted from the ciphertext. Shannon has shown that in such a system:
• the amount of possible keys must be at least as large as the amount of possible messages,
• the key length must be at least as large as the message length and
• every key should be used only once.
Such a system has been invented 1917 by Major Joseph Mauborgne and Gilbert Vemam and
is called One-Time-Pad. In this approach every plaintext has the same probability.
The next sections gives an overview of the security algorithms and protocols, which have
been used in distributed systems.
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2.2.2.1 Hash Functions and Message Authentication Codes

A function H is considered to be a One-way-hash-function [Nvy94], if it has the following
properties:
1. The function H can be applied to arguments of any size.
2. The function H has an output of defined length.
3. For every message M, the value H(M) must be simple to compute.
4. For every h, it is not possible to find a message M, so that H(M)=h. (One-way-property)
5. For every message Mi it is not possible to find a message M2 , so that H(Mi)=H(M2).

Figure 2.15: Applying the Hash Function H

While usually H(M) has a size between 64 and 128-Bit, the message M can have a size up to a
few megabytes.
In practice it is possible to find two messages which produce the same value of the hash
function H. This leads to the introduction of collision avoiding mechanisms in hash functions,
which will reduce the probability of collisions to minimum.
One-way-hash-functions are also known as compression functions, contraction functions,
message digests, finger prints, cryptographic checksums, message integrity checks (MIC),
manipulation detection codes (MDC) and message authentication codes (MAC).
Hash functions are used to detect changes in messages used e.g. in financial transactions.
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Message Authentication Code

A Message Authentication Code is data, that is attached to a message, which is generated
using a hash algorithm. It is used for authentication and is warranting the integrity of the
transmitted data.
In detail: A secret information, which is only known by the sender and receiver, is attached to
the message. Such a secret information can be e.g. the session key. From the message and the
secret a checksum, called digest, is computed.
Properties of the digest:
1. Starting from the digest no initial information (message + secret) can be extracted.
2. Already a slight message modification implies a totally different digest.
The digest, as a MAC, is transmitted along with the message to the receiver. It protects the
message from unperceived changes. The computing of the correct digest is only possible if
the secret is known.
The most important hash algorithms are:
• The MD2 [RFC1319], MD4 [RFC 1320] and MD5 (Message Digest) Algorithms, which
have been developed by RSA Data Security. While MD2 is the slowest of these three
algorithms, MD4 is the fastest algorithm. The MD5 algorithm produces a 128-Bit
fingerprint (Message Digest) of the input data.
• The SHA (Secure-Hash Algorithm) is an algorithm, which has been developed by order
of the government of the US (Co-operation of NIST with NSA). The standard is known
under the term of Secure Hash Standard (SHS).
Fingerprints of messages are used together with public-key algorithms in digital signatures.

Advantages:
1. The “fingerprinf‘ of a file can be published, without revealing anything about the content.
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2. Hash functions can also be used to encrypt data.

Disadvantages:
1. There is no collision handling.
2. The one-way-property of hash functions has not yet been proved.

Conclusion
Hash algorithms can be used together with asymmetric and symmetric encryption algorithms.
It is recommended to use the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).

2.2.2.2 Asymmetric Encryption

Asymmetric methods differ from the conventional encryption methods and can be used to
encrypt and to sign documents. The concept of asymmetric encryption has been invented
1976 by W. Diffie and M. Heilman.
Using public-key methods, encryption and decryption can be represented as follows:

Plaintext P
w

Sender

Receiver

Public

Private

Key Kpub

Key Kpriv

l________

Cyphertext C
w

Encryption

EKpub(P) - C

Decryption

DKpriv(C)

Figure 2.16: Asymmetric Encryption and Decryption

50

Plaintext P

i

-P

w

Every user is owning two keys: the public-key, which can be accessed and used by every
other user and, the private-key, which should be kept secure. Usually, functions used to
perform encryption and decryption are one-way-functions.^
Before a encrypted message can be send, it is necessary to get the receivers public key Kpub .
The sender applies the encryption function E with the public-key Kpub of the receiver on the
plaintext P and obtains the ciphertext C. This ciphertext is sent to the receiver. The receiver
applies the decrypting function D together with the secret-key Kpriv on the ciphertext C and
obtains the plaintext P.[fig 2.16]
Public-key algorithms must have the following properties:
• The decryption must reproduce the correct plaintext
P = DKpriv(C) = DKpriv(EKpub(P))

• The recovery of the private key from the public key is practical impossible (theoretical
only with immense costs)
• Knowing the encryption function E, it is nearly impossible to recover the decryption
function D.
Some examples of public-key cryptosystems are Elgamal (invented by Taher Elgamal),
RSA ( named after its inventors, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adelman), DiffieHellman ( named after his inventors) and the Digital Signature Algorithm (invented by David
Kravitz).
The key-length is depending upon the needed security level and upon the progress in the area
of factorisation. It is recommended to be conservative during the selection of the right keylength.

^ A one-way-function is a function defined on a set X with values in the set Y, so that every f(x), where x is a
element of X, is simple to compute, while for almost every y from Y it is extremely difficult to find a f(x), with
f(x)=y.
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Advantages:
1. Asymmetric algorithms are more secure than symmetric algorithms, since the receivers
decryption key is not shared with the sender.
2. Asymmetric algorithms are considered to be “practically secure”. Public keys contain
information about private keys. But reasonable information recovery during realistic
time exposure is not possible [Inf95].
3. For a secure one-way communication from 1000 sender to one receiver, there is no need
for 1000 common keys. It is sufficient to own a key pair (public-key, private-key),
whereby the public-key is made available to the different senders.
4. Asymmetric algorithms need two keys per communication participant, while symmetric
algorithms need only one per participant. In a distributed system consisting of n nodes,
asymmetric algorithms need totally only 2*n keys, while the symmetric algorithm needs
totally n*(n-l)/2 keys.
5. Digital signatures can be easily implemented using asymmetric algorithms.

Disadvantage:
1. Asymmetric algorithms are slow.

Conclusions
Asymmetric algorithms can be considered proved. Authenticity and confidentiality are
independent and participant-bound.

New functions are available, which would not be

possible with conventional methods.
Due to their public keys, asymmetric algorithms are proper for the deployment in distributed
systems.
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2.2.23 Symmetric Encryption

Symmetric algorithms are established methods, that use only one key to encrypt and to
decrypt information, i.e. sender and receiver share a single key. This key must be kept secret.
Symmetric algorithms are mainly used for encryption and are as well known as secret-key
algorithms. A schematic description follows:

Receiver

Sender

Plaintext P
--------------- w

Secret

Secret

KeyK

KeyK

r

_

Ciphertext C

________ 3 r__

Encryption

Decryption

C = Ek(P)

P = Dk(C)

Plaintext P
w

Figure 2.17: The Secret-Key Algorithm

Most of the symmetric encryption algorithms use

data blocks of fixed length. During

encryption, this block is transformed into a encrypted block of same size. The following four
different block-oriented modes can be used by symmetric algorithms:
• Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode,
• Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode,
• Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode,
• Output-Feedback (OFB) mode.
For further details see [Sch96].
The most important symmetric algorithms are listed below:

53

•• the Data-Encryption-Standard (DES) was defined in the ANSI X3.92 Standard in 1981.
The algorithm uses 64-Bit blocks for encryption and is based on two basic encryption
techniques: confusion and diffusion, where confusion hides the relationship between
plaintext and ciphertext and diffusion distributes the influence of a single plaintextbit on as
many as possible chiphertextbits.
• the Triple-DES algorithm was the result of the improvement of the old DES algorithm,
which does not comply to the security requirements in our days. Triple-DES can be
considered to be a interim solution. The triple encryption with three keys produces the
ciphertext C = Ek3(Dk2(Eki(P))) and after decryption the plaintext P = Dki(Ek2(Dk3(C))).
Thereby, it is important to pay attention to the right key-sequence.
• the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) has been developed at the ETH
Zurich (Switzerland). The algoritlim uses 64-bit plaintext-blocks and a 128-bit long key to
encrypt data. IDEA uses confusion and diffusion too. The strength of the algorithm is the
result of the mix of different operations from different algebraic groups [Sch96].
• RC2 and RC4 are encryption algorithms with variable key-length.

Advantages:
1. Symmetric algorithms are considerable faster than asymmetric algorithms.
2. Symmetric algorithms need smaller keys than asymmetric algorithms. A conventional 128bit key is equivalent to a 3000-bit public key [PGP99].
3. The security of the symmetric algorithms lies in the key.

Disadvantages:
1. Assuming that every two users need one key, then n users communicating in a distributed
system will need n*(n-l)/2 keys.
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2. If a key is compromised, then attackers will be able to evaluate the whole message traffic
or even will be able to send falsified mails.
3. A key is as valuable as all information, that have been encrypted with the same key. Key
management for symmetric algorithms is harder to manage than for asymmetric
algorithms.
4. Symmetric algorithms are not suitable for the use in digital signatures.

Conclusions
Characterised by high encryption speed, symmetric algorithms are mainly used to encrypt
data. The IDEA algorithm is one of the best symmetric algorithms. The use of this algorithm
in commercial products requires a licence.

2.2.2.4 Hybrid Encryption

Hybrid cryptosystems combine the advantages of complementary elements

of different

technologies. They take the strengths of public key cryptography to distribute keys in a secure
mode. Also they rely on secret key cryptography to encrypt the content of messages because
this technology is best suited to bulk data encryption.
As an example Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) can be mentioned. PGP is a hybrid cryptosystem,
which combines the best features of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography.

Figure 2.18: PGP Encryption
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During encryption [fig.2.18] PGP passes the following steps:
1. The plaintext is compressed, saving disk space, transmission time and strengthening
cryptographic security [Dip96].
2. PGP generates a session key, which is a one-time-only secret key.
3. The plaintext is encrypted using the session key,
4. The session key is encrypted using the receivers public key.
Decryption works similar in reverse, see figure 2.19.

Symmetric Session Key

Asymmetric Private Key (Receiver)
Figure 2.19: PGP Decryption

PGP can use different encryption algorithms, e.g. IDEA, DES, etc. Since it is to simple to be
broken, DES should not be used. It makes sense to use IDEA.
Keys are stored in encrypted form in different files, depending on the key type (public or
secret key). These flies are called keyrings.
As advantages, we can mention the advantages of symmetric and asymmetric algorithms.
Major disadvantages depend on the concrete implementation.
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Conclusions

On the basis of the known advantages, hybrid encryption algorithms can be recommended for
the deployment in distributed systems.

2.2.2.5 Digital Signatures

A digital signature is similar to a hand written signature stored in electronic form. A signature
is characterised by [Beu95]:
• Authenticity: Guarantees that the document originates from the person that signed the
document.
• Identity: Every signature has been produced by a certain person.
• Data Integrity: Guarantees that the data has not been corrupted.
• Non-repudiation: This prevents the sender from claiming that he did not actually send the
information.
• Complexity: The signature must be complex enough.
• Ability to verify the signature: Every receiver of a signed message must be able to verify
the signature attached to the message.
A electronic signature can be represented as a safe made of glass, [fig. 2.20]. Only the owner
can open the safe and deposit a message (e.g. a statutory declaration) in a well visible way.
Everybody reading the message can assume, that the message is owned or was written by the
owner of the safe. The signing of a message corresponds with the enclosure of the message.
The process of reading the message through the glass of the safe corresponds to the signature
verification.
The signature scheme can be defined as follows:
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Every user owning a secret function S is able to sign a certain message. With his public
function V, he is able to verify signatures. It is practical impossible to extract the secret
function S from the public function V.

Figure 2.20: The Safe of Glass as a Model for the Electronic Signature

Public-key algorithms are well-suited for use in algorithms, which implement digital
signatures. While signing a document corresponds to the encryption with the own private key,
verifying a signature of a document corresponds to the decryption with the public key of the
sender.
The signing process of a longer document consists of the following steps[fig. 2.21]:
1. Computing the value of the hash function on the document,
2. Signing the value of the hash (if public-key algorithms are used - encrypting with the own
private key KApriv),
3. Attaching the signature at the end of the document,
4. Encrypting the whole document. In figure 2.21 the document is encrypted with a
asymmetric algorithm using the public key Kspub- Bigger documents can be encrypted
using a symmetric encryption algorithm because of the higher encryption speed.
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Bob

Alice

Figure 2.21: Signing and Verifying a Document

The process, during which a signature of a document is verified, consists of the following
steps [fig. 2.21]:
1. Encrypting the whole document (with the private key Kspriv),
2. Computing the value of the hashfunction of the plaintext document,
3. Verifying the signature:
• Decrypting the value of the signature (if public-key algorithms are used, then a
public key KApub is used for encrypting),
• Comparing the hashvalue from step (2) with the hashvalue of the decrypted
signature. If the values are equal then the signature has been successfully verified.
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It is not recommended to encrypt the document without the corresponding signature (see
[1X95]), since the danger of a Birthday-attack [Sch96] is immanent.
Alterations in the signed document leads to the failure of the signature verification of the
document.
The presented algorithm [fig.2.21] has the following advantages:
the digital signature has always the same length and is not depending of the length of the
message,
because of the use of One-way-hashfunctions, this algorithm offers a higher security level.

2.2.2.6 Certificates

If two users want to exchange their public keys using a insecure channel, e.g. through the
Internet, then both must be sure to get the right keys. The risk of a man-in-the-middle attack
exists, i.e. a third person might be able to exchange the transmitted key with his public key.
This implies that this person would be able to copy all the messages exchanged between these
two persons.
A digital certificate are information included with a person’s public key that helps others
verify that a key is valid [PGP99].
The Certification Authority (CA) issues certificates to different users, belonging to a certain
organisation. It certifies and digitally signs them using the CA’s private key [PGP99]. Every
user, requesting a public key of another user, is now able to check the authenticity of a key.
Public-Key-Certificates contain a public key, while Private-Key-Certificates contain a private
key. To prevent key theft, every private key is encrypted with itself.
Keys are stored in a keyring together with their certificates.
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Users of RSA-technologies will append their public key at the end of every message that has
been sent. This implies that the receiver will not request the senders public key. In this case
the certificate is also called “Digital ID“, which is represented in figure 2.22.
The public key is stored in such a Digital ID, which contains:
• the User ID,
• the Actual Key,
• the Timestamp, containing the exact date of the key generation,
• the unique Number of the Digital Certificate,
• the Signature of the Certifying Authority, which guarantees the keys authenticity.

User ID: Name, Address, Company

Users Public Key

Digital ID: Expiration Date/Time

Digital ID Certificate Number

Digital Signature and ID related Information
from the certifying instance.

Figure 2.22: Digital ID (key certificate)

There are different types of certificates. Two of the most important of them are the following:
• the X.509v3 certificate, which complies with the ITU-T X.509 standard,
• the PGP certificate.
More Information about these two certificates can be found in [RFC2459] and [PGP99].
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The receiver of a message with key certificate will verify the public key using the digital ID.
After that, the message is verified using the public key. This is only possible if the public key
is registered at a Certification Authority.
Trust between the Certification Authority and the user is necessary to get a allocated digital
ID. Trust is usually obtained by checking the users identity. Hierarchies of digital IDs are set
up based on trust, [fig. 2.23]

Figure 2.23: Example of a Certification Authority Hierarchy

Public keys can be distributed in two major modes:
manual and
using certificate servers, which are store-only repositories.
Certificate server contain a database that allows users to submit and retrieve certificates. A
structured system that provides key management features is called Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI).
Certificates have a restricted lifetime. When a certificate expires it is no longer valid. A
revoked certificate indicates that the certificate’s public key has been compromised and is
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much more suspect than a expired certificate. Only the certificate’s issuer can revoke his
X.509 certificate. Revoked certificates are published in a Certificate Revocation List (CRI.)
by the CA.
Certificates make only sense if the user belongs to a Certifying Hierarchy.

2.2.2.7 Current Security Facilities

Secure Socket Layer (SSL)

The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol secures the communication between two entities,
usually known as client and server. This protocol is based on public-key-cryptography,
particularly on the use of X.509v3 certificates. This certificate is used to assign a public key
to a certain person.
SSL offers Channel-Security with the following properties:
1. The channel is “private”, i.e. after a handshake-phase, during which a key is generated, all
the messages are sent in encrypted form.
2. The channel is unique: the server is always identified in a unique mode, while the
identification of the client is optional.
3. The channel is reliable: the message integrity is guaranteed by the use of a Message
Integrity Check (Message Authentication Code).
The SSL handshake protocol consists of two phases[fig. 2.24]:
• Phase 1, which is used to establish a secure connection between the entities.
• Phase 2, during which the authentication of the client is accomplished.
Phase 1:
During the introductory part, the client starts sending a CLIENT-HELLO message, which will
be replied by the server with a SERVER-HELLO message. Now, client and server must
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decide if a new Master Key is needed or not. The Master Key is used from the client and the
server to generate a Session Key. If the Master Key exists, the protocol continues with phase
2.
If the Master Key is missing, then the SERVER-HELLO message will be containing enough
information, so that the client will be able to generate a Master Key. The SERVER-HELLO
message contains:
• a signed certificate of the server,
• a list of supported public key algorithms and
• a Connection-ID

Client

Server

First Part

Second Part

J

Figure 2.24: The SSL- Handshake Protocol
After that, the client will reply with a Client-Master-Key message. For more details about the
generated keys and used messages, see [SSL96].
After the generation of the Master-Key, the server sends a SERVER-VERIFY message to the
client. This last step authenticates the server.
Phase 2:
This part correlates to the client authentication. A typical scenario can be the following:
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• the server request something from the client,
• the client replies by sending the requested information or by sending a error message.
If the authentication has been finished, a “finished” message will be exchanged between client
and server. This step terminates the SSL handshake.

Advantages:
• This protocol, which is located between the transport layer and the application layer, is
independent from the application layer protocols, e.g. HTTP, FTP, Telnet,
• The SSL protocol is able to negotiate the encryption algorithm and the session key.
The SSL protocol is often used in different applications. It is referred by the OMG as
providing Level 0 Security.

Kerberos

Kerberos is a thrusted third party authentication protocol, which allows a client to contact
different servers in the network. It is based on symmetric cryptography and uses DES or
similar algorithms.
Kerberos exists in two major versions (4 and 5), which are not compatible among each other.
They have been developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) for the Athena
project. Kerberos Ver. 4 has been described in RFC 1411 (Request For Comments 1411),
while Kerberos Ver. 5 (Keberos Network Authentification System) is described in RFC 1510.
In the following lines we will describe how Kerberos works [fig. 2.25]:
Before the client can access the server, it requests a ticket for a Ticket-Granting Service
(TGS) from Kerberos. Kerberos sends this ticket, which is encrypted with the client’s secret
key, to the client. To use a particular server, the client requests a ticket for that server from
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the TGS. The ticket is send back to the client. The client then presents the ticket with an
authenticator to the server. If everything is ok, then the client can access the server.

Figure 2.25: Kerberos authentication steps [Sch96]

A ticket contains the client’s name,

the client’s network address, the server’s name, a

timestamp and a session key. All these information is encrypted with the server’s secret key.
The client cannot decrypt this ticket, but can present it to the server.
Authenticators can only be used once, unlike a ticket. Authenticators consists of the client’s
name, a timestamp, and a optional additional session key. Everything is encrypted with the
session key shared between the client and the server.

Advantages/ Disadvantages
Beneath the apparent advantages, there are a lot of vulnerabilities, as Steve Bellovin and
Michael Merritt have shown in [Bel91], e.g. it is possible to cache and to replay old
authenticators, the time protocol is insecure and the biggest whole is the fact that the Kerberos
protocol rely on the fact that the Kerberos software is (allways) trustworthy.
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Kerberos is often used in distributed systems (e.g. CORBA, DCOM), but this does not mean
that it is a perfect solution.

Virtual Private Networks

Virtual Private Network is a software-defined network offering the appearance, functionality
and usefulness of a dedicated private network [Kov99]. The idea of the VPN is to give the
company

the same

capabilities at much

lower cost

by using

the shared

public

infrastructure e.g. Internet, rather than a private one. An Internet-based VPN uses the open,
distributed infrastructure of the Internet to transmit data between corporate sites.
VPNs allow secure connection between two points across the Internet through the use of a
tunnelling protocol. Tunnelling [fig. 2.26] is the process by which VPNs transfer information
by encapsulating traffic and sending the packets over the Internet [TutOO].

Figure 2.26: Tunneling

VPNs do not maintain permanent links between the end points that make up the corporate
network. When a connection between two sites is needed, it is created; when the connection is
no longer needed, it is tom down.
Tunnels can consist of two types of end points, either an individual computer or a LAN with
a security gateway (router, firewall). VPN software is typically installed as part of a firewall
server. [TecOO]
VPNs are used if at least one of the following conditions [Raj99] are fulfilled:
67

• Many locations have to be interconnected.
• Locations are situated at long distance.
• Modest bandwidth is available.
• Quality of Service (QoS) is not critical.
Key Issues [Raj99] when deploying VPNs over the Internet are address translations, security
and performance.
The main components of a VPN [TutOO] are :
• The Internet - which will be described in chapter 5.
• Security gateways, which are located between public and private networks, preventing
intrusion into the private network. Tunnelling and encryption capabilities (router, firewall,
VPN Hardware or VPN software) are available.
• Security policy servers maintain the access control lists and other user-related information
that the security

gateway uses to determine which traffic is authorised. E.g. RADIUS

• Certificate authority - described in chapter 2.

2.2.2.8 Security on different Levels

Internet-based VPNs include measures for encrypting data passed between VPN sites, which
protects the data against eavesdropping and tampering by unauthorised parties. [TutOO]
Encryption can be performed at different levels and is dependant on the tunnelling protocol
used. An overview of the different tunnelling protocols, which can be used to set up VPNs is
listed in figure 2.17.
The PPTP relies on the

authentication mechanisms within PPP, namely the password

authentication protocol (PAP). PPTP supports only one connection.
L2F has a few advantages: it is not dependant on IP and supports more than one connection.
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IPSEC supports different cryptographic encryption algorithms and can be used in the
following two modes:
• Tunnel mode, where the original IP header is encrypted and
• Transport mode, where the original IP header is removed and only transport data is
encrypted.
The SOCKS protocol (v4 and v5) provides among other security features ( authentication
mechanisms, access mechanisms, encryption mechanism ) the possibility to set up a virtual
private network [SOC96].
OSI Layer
Application
Presentation
Session
Transport
Network

Protocols

I
I
I
1
I

Data Link

Application-specific VPNs

}
}
}
}

SOCKS
SSL/TLS
IPSec
PPTP/L2TP/L2F

Physical

Figure 2.27: Protocols used to set up VPNs [SOC98]

Application Level Security (Layer 7) can be implemented using one of the following
mechanisms: Secure HTTP, SSL, Secure MIME, Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) and
Private Communication Technology (PCT).

Advantages

The main advantages are:
69

• costs savings as a result of reduced equipment [TutOO],
• increased flexibility and scalability,
• secure remote access to international business partners[UpdOO].

Disadvantage

The use of TCP/IP has the following big disadvantage: TCP/IP has not been designed for
guaranteeing security and network performance [TutOO].

Due to the above mentioned advantages, Virtual Private Networks are used in Extranets,
Wide Area Networks and to access different networks.

2.2.3 Conclusions

In distributed systems it is recommended to combine the cryptographic algorithms e.g.
asymmetric algorithms for key management and symmetric algorithms for encryption. The
use of signature and certificates represents a further security level. The present security
solutions are unthinkable without cryptography.
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Chapter 3 Specific Security Problems in CORBA , Java and Mobile Agents

3.1 Security in CORBA

After a long period of work the OMG published the Security Service Specification [OSV98]
in the mid 1996. This part is based on the December 1998 update.
Distributed objects require additional security features due to the following complications,:
•

Distributed objects can play a dual role, i.e. they can be client and server at the same time.

•

Distributed objects are very dynamic, i.e. they are in continuous change.

•

The interactions between distributed objects are not predictable and sometime even not
easy to understand.

•

Distributed Objects are polymorph.

Beside the fundamental security-goals, mentioned in chapter one, the following goals are
CORBA specific:
•

Object oriented interfaces and object implementation.

•

Object invocations are protected and performing access control and audit.

•

Encapsulation hides the complexity of security mechanisms.

•

Security across different Object Request Brokers has to be provided.

The CORBA Security Service plans a security level similar to the B2 certification (Orange
Book).
There are two major classes of applications, which use the CORBA Security Services:
•

Security aware applications, which have the possibility to influence the security policy
the ORB enforces on its behalf

•

Security unaware applications, which transparently use the ORB Security Service.
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An ORB must provide at least one of the following packages:
•

Security Functionality Level 1 provides a level of security for security unaware
applications and for those having limited requirements to enforce their own security in
terms of access control and auditing.

•

Security Functionality Level 2 provides more security facilities (e.g. administration of
security policies), and allows applications to control the security provided at object
invocation.

3.1.1 The CORBA Security Reference Model and Architectures

A security model usually defines a specific set of security policies. The OMG has specified
the security reference model as a

meta-policy^ because it is intended to

encompass all

possible security policies supported by the OMA.

Figure 3.1: CORBA Security [Orf98]

^ The meta-policy defines the abstract interfaces that are provided by the security architecture defined in the
specification [OSV98].
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Figure 3.1 represents the simplified model of a secure ORB. All object invocations are
mediated by the corresponding security functions that enforce a security policy. To comply to
the high requirements of the CORBA security service specification, all clients must be able to
be authenticated by the ORB. Further all resources must be protected using access control
lists.
The main security mechanisms, which will be discussed later in this part, are listed below:
Principals and Credentials,
Authentication,
Secure Invocations,
Authorisation and Access Control,
Domains and Policies,
Privilege Delegation,
Message Protection,
Non-repudiation,
Audit.

3.1.1.1 Principals and Credentials

A Principal is a user or a system entity that is at least registered, usually also authenticated, by
the system. After the authentication has been performed by the distributed system, a principal
is given a set of Credentials.
Credentials are consisting of a principals security attributes, including privilege attributes (e.g.
roles, groups, capabilities) and authenticated or unauthenticated (access) identities, see figure
3.2. Unauthenticated users have credentials, which limit their access to public objects.
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Security attributes may be acquired in three ways:
•

Public attributes are available without authentication to any principal.

•

Attributed that are acquired through authentication, (e.g. privilege attributes)

•

Some attributes are acquired through delegation from other principals

Credentials - containing Security Attributes
Authenticated Attributes
Unauthenticated
Attributes - public

Identity
Attributes

Privilege
Attributes

Figure 3.2: Credential Containing Security Attributes [OSV98]

A Prineipal Authenticator object is the application-visible object responsible for the creation
of Credentials for a given principal.

3.1.1.2 Authentication

A client needs an identity that is able to access different objects. An active entity is a principal
or an element that behaves like a principal.
The steps during which a principal is authenticated and his privileges are propagated is
represented in figure 3.3. The user authenticates itself by passing security relevant
information (e.g. login, password) to the Principal Authenticator, which creates a Credential
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object. After that, the user passes a reference to the credentials of the Currenf object. The
Current object represents the current execution context.

authenticate

Figure 3.3: Principal Authentication and Privilege Propagation [Orf98]

Any secure method invocation uses the Security Service of the ORB. The Security Service
gets his security information from the Current object. A security-aware target object can get
information about the incoming call from its local Current object.
The actual authentication depends on the underlying mechanism. If Kerberos is used, there
will be an Authentication Server, which contains authentication information [LAN97].

^ The current object represents the current execution context at both client and target objects.
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3.1.1.3 Secure Invocations

A secure association can be established by the client and the target by:
•

Establishing trust in one another’s identities (authentication),

•

Making the client’s credentials available to the target object,

•

Establishing the security context.

The CORBA term for security association is binding. CORBA uses information associated
with the client and server (e.g. object references) to establish the binding.
To establish a security association, the Secure Invocation Service checks if a binding already
exists. If there is no binding, e new one is created between the client and target, see figure 3.4.
This is done by the Vault which has been invoked by the Secure Invocation Service. The
Vault and the created Security Context objects are invisible to all applications. They also
exist twice (one on the client side and the other on the target side).

Figure 3.4: Secure Invocation and Access Control [OSV98]

76

3.1.1.4 Authorisation and Access Control

Once the client is authenticated, it has to be guaranteed that the clients can perform only the
action they are authorised for. Therefor the following mechanisms exist:
•

Access Control Lists (ACLs) which control the access using lists, as shown in figure 3.5.

•

Capability Lists are used to control user access, for details see [OSV98].

•

Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is based on the fact that every principal can have
many roles.

In figure 3.5 an example is presented. There are three different lists. The Principal Role
Attribute List maps different rolls to a list of principals. On the other side every roll has
certain rights fixed in the Role Access Control List. Last but not least, the Authorisation List
maps the allowed operations to different rights.

Roles Access Control List
Role

Principal

Role

Right

j
:J

Principals Role Attributes List

Right

Operation

Authorisation List

Figure 3.5: Access Control Lists Example [Orf98]

ACLs can have different levels of granularity. A high granularity level may result in a
nightmare [Orf98].
The Access Control Model provides a framework for many different access control security
policies. This framework contains two layers:
77

•

Application level access control (for security -aware applications). The client and target
objects can enforce local access policies by calling the Domain Manager.

•

System (ORB) level access control for security-aware and security-unaware applications.
The Access Control Object cannot be bypassed, since it is build into the ORB, see figure
3.4. After calling the Client Access Decision Object (Security Service), the Access
Control Object will make a decision based on the access policy and the required rights.

The client credentials and policies are stored in the Current object. Client side access control
is done independently from the target side access control.
The ORB checks if a certain client can invoke a certain operation under certain
circumstances. This decision[Orf98] is based on:
•

the current privileges of the caller,

•

any control that are applied to the privileges,

•

the operation to be invoked,

•

the access policy of the target

3.1.1.5 Domains and Policies

Objects, which have the same security requirements, are grouped in domains. A domain
contains elements with common characteristics and is characterised by the application of
common rules.
In a domain the security policy specifies the required security features. The security principles
in each domain are specified by the domain security policy.
A security policy is a set of rules that constrain one or more sets of elements. A security
policy need not apply to all activities or all elements in a distributed system. This means that
instances of it must include a definition to which activities and to which elements the security
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policy applies [LAN97]. Usually it concerns access control, authentication, secure object
invocation, delegation and accountability [OSV98].
There are several types of domains:
•

The Security Policy Domain, a scope where a security policy has been applied.

•

The Security Environment Domain, a scope where a policy is enforced by the use of
local means.

•

The Security Technology Domain uses common security mechanisms to enforce policies.

Security Policy Domains

A security domain is a set of elements administered under a given security policy, by a
security authority for some specific relevant activities. The activities of a security domain
involve one or more elements from that domain, however at least one of the elements must be
in that domain [IS095]. A (security) authority (e.g. security policy manager) is responsible
for defining the policies to be applied to the domain. It is also able to delegate responsibilities
to a number of subauthorities, which apply their policies to the corresponding subdomains
[fig. 3.6]. Subdomains may reflect organisational subdivisions.

Domains

Figure 3.6: Different Policy Subdomains
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In a federation of policy domains each domain keeps its authority, but additionally can agree
on other limited rights. A federation agreement specifies how policy differences are handled
(e.g. mapping of roles from one domain to roles from the other domain). .
In overlapping policy domains not all policies have the same scope.

Security Policy Manager

Figure 3.7: System and Application-Enforced Policies

The system security policy is enforced by the ORB and the Security Services. It is the only
policy that applies to security unaware objects. The application security policy is enforced by
application objects.

Security Environment Domains

Environment domains ai*e by definition implementation-specific, as different implementations
run in different environment, which have different security characteristics. Environment
domains are not visible to applications or security services.
Since security costs at individual object level in different environment are high, it seems
unnecessary to use security at object level [OSV98]. This can be only put into practice if
higher level security exists.
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Security Technology Domains

Security Technology Domains are domains that use the same security technology to enforce
security policies.
A trusted domain is a domain that consists of different objects which trust each other.

Domain Interoperability

Figure 3.8: Framework of Domain Interoperability

The level of security interoperability between domains is limited. Figure 3.8 shows a
framework of domain interoperability.
To inter-operate

between different ORB implementations, that

are in the same security

technology domain, it is necessary to use a CORBA 2 interoperability bridge. On this level
there are a lot of restrictions:
•

If the ORBs are in different domains, the crossing of such domains without the use of a
security technology gateways is not possible. Security technology gateways allow
messages to pass between two different security domain technology.

•

If the objects are in different security policy domains, crossing a security policy boundary
can be handled by a security policy federation agreement. Therefor the existence of a
gateway is necessary.
81

3.1.1.6 Delegation

Often, when performing an operation, a client will call objects different from the target object.
The delegation model shown in figure 3.9 is the result of the existence of chains of calls.
Excepting the initiating client and the final target, every element in a chain has a dual
function: it is target and client at the same time. The complexity of the model is high, since in
every element of the chain different decisions can be taken.

Figure 3.9: Delegation Model

Intermediate elements may use their own privileges or use the privileges of the delegating
element. The case in which only the initiator’s privileges are used is called impersonation.
The caller cannot restrict privileges to particular methods of objects, since it does not know
which object will be used in the completion of the request. But he can specify restrictions on
the use of the access control information provided to another object.
The following facilities are supported (for details see [OSV98]):
•

control of delegated privileges,

•

control of target restrictions,

•

control of privileges used.

The following delegation types have been defined by the OMG:
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No delegation [fig. 3.10].The intermediate objects can use its privileges for access control
decisions, but are not able to delegate them. Intermediate objects are only allowed to
delegate their own (intermediate) credentials.
Client
Credentials

Intermediate
Credentials

_________ Intermediate
Object

-► Server

Figure 3.10: No Delegation

•

Simple delegation [fig.3.il]. The intermediate object is able to use the clients credentials
for access control decisions and to delegate them to others. Usually the server does not
know who the intermediate object is.

Client
Credentials

Client
Credentials
Intermediate
Object

Client

Server

Figure 3.11: Simple Delegation

Composite delegation [fig 3.12]. The intermediate object can use the clients credentials
and delegate them. Both, the clients privileges and the intermediate objects privileges are
passed to the server, so that they can be individually checked.

Client
Credentials
Client

Client &
Intermediate
Credentials
Intermediate
Object

Figure 3.12: Composite Delegation
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-►I; Serveff

Combined privileges delegation [fig. 3.13]. The intermediate object can use the clients
privileges. The resulting credential combines the clients credentials with the intermediate
objects credentials and pass it to the server (target) object.
Client &
Intermediate
Credentials
(In a single
credentiah

Client
Credentials

Figure 3.13: Combined Privilege Delegation

•

Traced delegation. The intermediate object can use the clients privileges and delegate
them. The privileges of the passed intermediate objects are added to the chain of
privileges, which are passed to the server (target).

•

Time restrictions. The duration of delegations can be restricted by the use of time periods.

Every object used should be able to :
•

extract credentials for use, when making the next call as a delegate,

•

extract received privileges and use them in local access control decisions,

•

build new credentials from the received access control information.

A delegation option can be used to specify a default delegation for an object. This allows
many applications to be unaware of the delegation options in use. In this case the control of
delegation is done by the ORB, which corresponds to the Security Functionality Level 1
[OSV98].
Security aware applications may specify what type of delegation they want to perform. This is
possible only at the Security Functionality Level 2.
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3.1.1.7 Message Protection

Messages can be protected for:
•

Integrity, see chapter 1,

•

Confidentiality, which ensures that the messages have not been read in transit.

While integrity protection may require sealing the message, confidentiality protection will
require encrypting it. Integrity and confidentiality can sometime be provided through
mechanisms inherent in the environment and so having to avoid the use of encryption.
Using the CORBA Security Service messages can be protected even if there is no security in
the underlying communication software. If protection is provided below the ORB message
layer (e.g. with SSL), no message protection at ORB level will be necessary [OSV98J.
The Security Service defines exchangeable subsystems, which allow the use of standard
encryption technology, e.g. RSA, Kerberos, SSL, NIS+.

3.1.1.8 Non-repudiation

The Non-repudiation Service provides facilities to make principals accountable for their
actions. Non-repudiation requires the existence of one or more pieces of evidence. There are
two common types of evidence:
•

the evidence of proof of creation, which protects against an originator’s false denial of
having created a message,

•

the evidence of proof of receipt, which protects against a recipient’s false denial of having
received a message.

The non-repudiation service defined by the OMG is oriented on the ISO Non-repudiation
model. This service includes the facilities to generate evidence of an action and verify the
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evidence later.

Further the existence of a (delivery) authority [fig. 3.14], that delivers the

evidence and the message from the originator to the recipient is necessary.

Evidence of creation

Object Request Broker

Evidence
generation and
verification

Delivery
authority

Evidence
storage and
retrieval

Non-repudiation Services ;

^

T

Evidence
store

Figure 3.14: The ISO-Non-repudiation Model

This authority is able to generate a proof of origin and a proof of delivery. Detailed
definitions can be found in IS07498-2. The delivery authority has not been specified by the
OMG. In fact only the evidence generation and verification has been specified. The ISO
conform non-repudiation definition provides:
•

generation of evidence of an action,

•

verification of evidence of an action,

•

generation of a request for evidence related to a message sent,

•

receipt of a request for evidence related to a received message,

•

collection of evidence,
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•

analysis of details of evidence of an action.

When a dispute arises a mediator is required. It will use the evidence storage and the retrieval
facilities to settle the dispute, see figure 3.14.

3.1.1.9 Audit

Security auditing assists in the detection of security violations by recording details of security
relevant events. Audit policies can be classified into:
•

System Audit Policies control what events are recorded as the result of relevant system
activities, e.g. changing privileges, success or failure of object invocation. System audit
policies are enforced automatically for all applications (even

security-unaware

application). System auditing is done on the client side as well as on the server side.
•

application audit policies control which events are audited by applications, see figure
3.15.

The decision on whether to audit an event or not, can be based on:
•

the event type (e.g. method invocation complete...),

•

the success or the failure of an event,
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•

the object and the operation being invoked,

•

the audit identity (ID) of a principal,

•

the time of the day.

Events can be recorded on audit trails for later analysis or if the event is important, alarms can
be sent to a certain person.

3.1.2 Security and Interoperability

The secure use of interoperability protocols requires at least the following extensions:
•

the specification of tags in the lOR permits the lOR to carry information about the
security policy for the target object and the security technology used.

•

A security interoperability protocol to support the establishment of a secure binding
between client and target.

•

Security when using the DCE-CIOP protocol.

3.1.2.1 The Interoperability Model

The lOR, used for registering the server object, contains security information ( e.g. security
name, security policy attributes of the target and the security technology supported), which
help the client to communicate securely with the server.
If there is no binding (security association) between the client and the server, a new one is
established by

transmitting security tokens between them. At least the GSS-API initial

context token must be send from the client to the target object. Every message transmitted
between client and server is protected, see figure 3.16.
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ORB Security
Services

ORB Security
Services

Protected message e.g. Security token
ORB Core

Figure 3.16: Secure Interoperability Model

In SECIOP

message stream protection is provided by encapsulating

all SECIOP data

payloads in a sequencing protocol frame.
The OMG does not specify a standard security mechanism to be supported by all secure
ORBs, but it specifies how clients can identify the security mechanisms supported by the
target. The following two major types of security mechanisms exist for security associations:
symmetric key technology and asymmetric key technology.
Secure Interoperability Bridges [OSV98] between ORB domains may be needed for:
•

ORB mediated bridges,

•

Translating between security mechanisms (technology domains),

•

Mapping between security policy domains.

The OMGs specification does not specify how these bridges should be build.
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3.1.2.2 Common Secure Interoperability Levels

The Common Secure Interoperability Levels have been defined to help in classifying the
various facilities that exist.
•

CSI Level 0 supports only identity-based policies without delegation.

•

CSI Level 1 supports identity-based policies with or without unrestricted delegation.

•

CSI Level 2 supports identity- and privilege-based policies with controlled delegation.

Further details can be found in the specification [OSV98].

3.1.2.3 The Secure Inter-ORB Protocol (SECIOP)

The Secure Inter-ORB Protocol has been introduced to guarantee the secure transmission of
General Inter-ORB Protocol (GIOP) messages. This protocol is positioned between the
Internet Inter-ORB Protocol (HOP) and GIOP, see figure 3.17.

7
GIOP

GIOP

SECIOP

SECIOP

Figure 3.17: The SECIOP Protocol

This protocol assumes the following environmental characteristics[OSV98]:
•

Each SECIOP-secure binding is bound to a single transport connection

•

SECIOP may use multiple security bindings over the same transport connection.
90

•

SECIOP ensures that fragments are sent over transport connections in their sequence
number order.

•

When a transport connection is closed, all SECIOP secure bindings are closed as well.

•

There is always a listener at the client and server prepared to receive and sent SECIOP
messages.

•

The client and the server may initiate security context establishment.

•

There are Data Protection protocol information (e.g. GSSAPI tokens) carried with the
SECIOP messages.

3.1.2.4 Security Mechanisms Hosted on SECIOP

The classification of the security protocols hosted on SECIOP can be found in table 3.1.
The Simple Public-Key Generic Security Services (GSS)-API Mechanism (SPKM) uses
public key technology for keys assigned to principals and trusted authorities. Details can be
found in [SPK96].
The Generic Security Services (GSS) Kerberos Protocol uses secret key technology for keys
assigned to principals and trusted authorities. It can be used with and without delegation. For
details see the IETF Kerberos V5 specification.

CSI Level

SPKM Protocol

GSS Kerberos

CSI-ECMA

0

Supported

Supported

Supported

1

Not supported

Supported

Supported

2

Not supported

Not supported

Supported

Table 3.1: Security Mechanisms hosted on SECIOP
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For key assignment to principals the CSI-ECMA Protocol can use secret key or public key
technology. The assignment of keys for trusted authorities can be done using public key
technology. SESAME is a significant subset of the CSI-ECMA Protocol. For details see
[SESxx].
The main encryption algorithms used are RSA, DES and RC4. The main hash function used is
MD5. The use of additional cryptographic algorithms is possible.

3.1.2.5 Security Mechanisms Hosted Directly on HOP

The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) can be used to provide secure interoperability based on
protocols hosted directly on HOP. But it supports identity-based policies without delegation
(CSI- Level 0) only when the optional authentication features of SSL are used.
SSL provides a secure transport layer over TCPAP. In this case the use of the CORBA
SECIOP protocol is not required. Instead, the connection rules of HOP [ORB99] are applied
to SSL.

3.1.3 The DCE-Common Inter-ORB Protocol (DCE-CIOP)

The DCE-CIOP Protocol uses the DCE Security Services and the DCE Authenticated
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) runtime. The DCE Security Services [OSFxx] provide the
following security features [OSV98]:
•

Cryptographically-secured mutual authentication of a client and target,

•

Ability to pass client identity and authorisation credentials to the target as part of a
request,

•

Protection against undetected, unauthorised modification of request data,

•

Cryptographic privacy of data,
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•

Protection against replay of requests and data.

The Secure DCE-CIOP specification defines the lOR profile components (identified by a
unique tag) required to support Secure DCE-CIOP. Client-secure association requirements are
specified by the client-side policy, while target-secure association requirements are specified
in the target lOR Profile security components. Both association requirements are mapped to
the DCE Security Services.
Depending on the features used, the DCE-CIOP Protocol can comply to all CSI levels (0-2).

3.1.4 Problems of CORBA Security

The CORBA Security Service provides a security framework. It uses only proven security
mechanisms (e.g. SSL, Kerberos) and does not solve any problems of the underlying security
mechanisms.
Traditional systems have at least two major problems:
•

system security (client OS cannot be trusted to protect the servers resources)

•

network security

The complexity of distributed systems cause additional vulnerabilities[OSV98]. Some of the
inherent characteristics of distributed object systems that make them vulnerable are listed
below:
•

Mutual Suspicion.In distributed systems some system components will not trust others.
Unjustified trust in some component might expose a vulnerability.

•

Dynamic Systems. Distributed objects are continually changing and are very dynamic.
This makes distributed object interactions less predictable and sometime hard to
understand. Distributed objects are also polymorph, which results in a higher level of
scalability. In [LAN97] the author speaks even about scalability without limits.
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•

Multiple Policy Domains. No single security policy is appropriate to all business. Policies
must be able to address interactions

across policy domain boundaries. Mismatched

policies could lead to vulnerabilities.
•

Layering of Security Mechanisms. The security mechanisms are layered. Complex
interactions at the boundary of layers often result in unknown vulnerabilities.

•

Complex Administration. Large distributed object systems are difficult to administer and
often lead to complex, error-prone administration.

3.1.4.1 Limitations of CORBA Security

Some limitations have been outlined \n Appendix F: Facilities Not in this Specification, which
was added to the specification [OSV98]. Find below the most important limitations:
•

Interoperability limitations between unlike domains include:
- no mapping between different policies,
- no translations across different domain boundaries,
- no specification of federated policy implementations,
- no specification of gateways to handle interoperability between different security
mechanisms.

•

Non-session-oriented SECIOP protocol. The current specification only supports sessionoriented underlying security mechanisms.

•

Mandatory security mechanisms. There is no particular security mechanism, which all
secure ORBs must implement.

•

Specific security policies. There are no other interfaces defined for other types of polices,
e.g. mandatory access control.

•

Other audit services. Filtering and routing of audit records, as well as audit reporting or
analysis tools are missing in the actual specification.
94

•

Possible Enhancements:
- SECIOP mechanism for option negotiation
- further key distribution options
- further delegation options at/above level 2
Interoperability when using non-repudiation. The format of the evidence token has not
been specified. When different ORBs use different security mechanisms, the token will
not be understood by one part. The evidence token is expected to be compatible with the
public key mechanism specified in the specification.
Audit Trail Interoperability. There is no standard defined by the OMG, which brings
together different audit records from different Audit Services.
Management. The specification does not define facilities for handling other policies and
domains and for managing some aspects of security like key creation and installation.
Reference restriction. It is a technique of access rights delegation which restricts the use
of an object reference according to a set of criteria. Reference restriction is not supported
in the current specification.
Target control of message protection.

In the current specification the target has no

interface to request the quality of protection for a particular response. The quality of
protection cannot be changed during a security association (binding).
Advanced delegation features. The application cannot control when and where credentials
are used. This might change in the future.
Overlapping and hierarchical domains. The specification does not require support for
overlapping or hierarchical security policy domains. But using the interfaces provided by
the specification, it is possible to implement them both.
Capability-based access control. The current specification has not defined interfaces that
support capability-based access control.
Non-repudiation services. This service does not include:
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- data processing
- specification of a delivery service
- non-repudiation policy processing interface
- standard token for interoperability

3.1.4.2 General Problems of CORBA Security

In addition to the problems mentioned in the previous section, here some problems that have
been classified into the following three categories:
•

Problems concerning ORBs,

•

Problems concerning CORBA compliant communication,

•

Other problems.

Problems concerning ORBs

Securing other CORBA services (e.g. time service, naming ser/ice, a secure audit trail
and a secure licensing) which are needed by the Security Service.
If an ORB has a large object population, high connectivity with large number of secure
associations or the object population is volatile, then individual object level security, e.g.
authenticating every object individually, can have as a result a too large overhead.
[OSV98]
Preventing objects from interfering with each other might require them to execute in
separate systems. This is an unacceptable overhead if applied to each object.
CORBA does not provide any evidence that a request

was successfully carried out,

CORBA only makes sure that the request is sent to the correct target object.
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-

If browsing the Interface Repository is subject to access control then the system should be
able to hide higher-security objects [LAN97].

-

Integrity protected messages will limit the type of interoperability bridge that can be used.
Any bridge that changes the protected part of the message after it has been integrity or
confidentiality protected will cause the security check at the target to fail unless a suitable
security gateway is used to reprotect the message [OSV98].
Privacy protection relies on trust. Information about callers can be used by information
brokers to set up mailing lists with people matching certain attributes.

Problems concerning CORBA compliant Communication

On one side it is not the objective of the CORBA Security Service to solve the typical
problems of IT security, but on the other side it is necessary to be able to solve this kind of
problems. Such problem arise e.g. when HOP communication has to pass firewalls. There is
no standard mechanism for a firewall to identify and control the flow of HOP traffic.
In actual implementations HOP uses different sockets to communicate, e.g. in lONA’s ORB
implementation, the Orbix daemon listens at port 1570, but communication occurs through
sockets in the range of 1590-1640. It is almost impossible to predict which socket will be
used. This causes problems when trying to get an HOP communication through a firewall.

Other Problems

Here can be mentioned the following architectural problem: The underlying operating
system, software and hardware are part of the distributed TCB^ It is possible to bypass

* All the components which are responsible for security enforcement are called distributed trusted
computing base (TCB) [OSV98].
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CORBA security at lower level by changing the operating system, software or hardware
components. The same may apply to the used security mechanisms. Some researcher
consider this as one of the fundamental problems of computer science [LAN97].
At the moment there are no restrictions concerning installation and distribution of
software in a CORBA compliant system. So everybody can install objects that have some
malicious payload in addition to the functionality known by users.
The huge size (around 834 pages) of the specification of the CORBA services make it
difficult to understand and to implement it.
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3.2 Security in Java

Additional Security (SSL,...)
Code Signing / Certificates
Access Controller
Security Manager
Class Loader

>

Java Virtual Machine ?

Bytecode Verifier/Loader
Java Language
Figure 3.18: Java’s Security Levels

Java’s new security concept is trying to transfer the distinction between good and bad from
the user to the system [May99].
Starting from bottom up, the first security level is the language itself. Further the Bytecode
Loader, the Bytecode Verifier and the Class Loader are parts of the Java Virtual Machine.
They can guarantee low level security. To operate a certain security policy a security manager
is essential. At the next level the administration of permissions, policies and domains is
handled by the Access Controller.
The additional security features had been organised in the next two levels. In a bigger
environment it must be possible to trust the offered applications. This can be reached by
using signatures and certificates.
Other features are used to additionally secure different communication layers. As an example
the Secure Socket Layer is used to make secure everything above the transport layer (TCP).

99

\

3.2.1 Java - the Programming Language

The responsibility of the language-level security is to make it impossible for a piece of code
to crash the run-time system or to access memory that has not been correctly allocated
[Sho96].
During the definition of the language it was important to remove language related security
gaps and hardware dependence. Therefore no enforced variable initialisation is required,
involving strictly bounds-checked array indexing, strict type checking, with no unexamined
type cast, no union, no struct construct, no functions and no pointers.
Garbage collection allows a secure way of memory reallocation. It is implemented as a
thread, which in the background collects the unused memory blocks and feeds the memory
allocator with the retrieved memory blocks [Gos95]. In memory the layout of objects will be
established only during the execution [Mat97].
In Java, multiple inheritance is only available for interfaces. It is not available for objects. An
interface is not an object, but a set of methods and constants (no variables !).
The introduced exception handling eases the controlled program truncation and is helpful for
the creation of robust applications. Exception handling, illegal and invalid actions or explicit
“throw” statements can change the control flow [Lin96]. For the handling of exceptions the
“catch” command is used. It is recommended not to handle all exceptions during one “catch”
command ( catch (Exception e)...).
Finally the block will always be executed as follows:
try { .. . . }
catch (ArithmeticException e]
finally {

System.out.printIn

}

If exceptions are not handled correctly, this will lead to premature truncation of the executed
method. If this happens, there will be a premature abortion of the invoked method which
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generates an error and returns a false value. This error will persist as long as no error handling
is processed. A cumulative effect results, if the error is not handled correctly resulting to a
delayed truncation of the whole program [Car96]. Any execution of a program must leave the
machine in a defined state. It should not be possible to bring the machine into a undefined
state. A faulty program, which uses exception handling, can generate an error message during
compilation or execution. This will not lead to an uncontrolled crash, because of the catch
statement which will prevent the machine from getting into a undefined state.
This security level offers protection against the accidental impact of programming failures
and bugs, but can be passed with a relative small amount of criminal knowledge e.g. through
a faulty compiler, by manipulating the generated code during the transmission, by producing
Java temporary code by using an assembler and so bypassing the high level language
inspection. During the execution additional precautions are needed.
Some of these precautions can be met by the verifier of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM).

3.2.2 The Java Virtual Machine (JVM)

The JVM is a run-time system consisting of a verifier, class loader, and an execution engine
[Sho96]. It is a stack machine with very compact commands, which tries to keep the control
even in the case of an attack. It has the possibility to access the file system, the Socket
Application Programming Interface (API), the processes and the other system resources
[Par96].
The Java byte code contains more information than are necessary for the execution. This
additional information contain descriptions of the data types, needed for security checks e.g.
index checking.
Many security checks are being performed by the JVM and the verifier during the loading
process. The verifier can be switched on or off using options. It is checking only the classes
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that have been retrieved through the network, see fig. 3.19. Locally installed classes do not
pass the verifier.

Translation

Runtime

Figure 3.19: The Java Machine

3.2.2.1 The Bytecode Verifier

The Bytecode Verifier checks that the bytecode does not violate any of the security tests
specified by the language. Bytecode Verifier cannot be bypassed or altered. It guarantees that
the run-time system can safely execute any approved bytecode. It should be impossible for
any Java program to modify approved bytecodes. Unfortunately the verifier is not as secure in
practice as the Java specification asserts [Sho96].
The class file verifier runs a “theorem prover” on the virtual machine code. The theorem
prover checks the code at a much deeper level. The operand stack is used consistently and
doesn’t overflow or underflow. Local variables are used consistently. Methods are used with
the right number and types of arguments.
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Checking all the possible routes in a program is a very costly process, called the halting
problem, that was studied by Alan Turing and Kurt Godel in the 1930s. In the general case it
is not possible to take a description of a program and decide whether or not the program will
complete.
The theorem prover is only concerned with types, it doesn’t check how many times a loop is
done. Some researcher claim, that it is impossible to formally prove the correctness of the
run-time’s type verifier[Sho96].

The Bytecode Verifier performs the following checks and analyses:
•

Analysing the class files: Every class is stored in a file using the canonical data structure
format. This structure contains a “magic” constant, versioning information, a pool of
constants, information about the class, information about every field and every method
contained in the mentioned class and additional debugging information. Beside the
inspections of the above mentioned entries, also the availability of other data will be
checked.

• Static analysis: This analysis verifies the number and the type of parameters of a method.
Another goal of this inspection is the compliance of the access rights of methods and
fields. In Java we can distinguish five different types of access rights upon fields and
methods. These rights are allocated using so called access modifier. The following have
been defined:
1. public - allows the access from every class.
2. protected - dX\ov<is the access from just ones own packages or subclasses.
3. private protected - allows the access from just subclasses.
4. private- allows the access from only your own class. No access is allowed from
subclasses.
5. default - allows the access from all classes of a package.
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• Dynamic analysis: The dynamic analysis is the analysis of the execution sequence of the
loaded code. The maximum stack length must not be exceeded. All operands have to apply
on operands with correct types. Typecasts are checked. Each instruction should be invoked
with the correct types. The content of the registers must be consistent.
• Runtime checks
The most important runtime checks are the following:
- The limits of the index of every array will be checked.
- Methods must always end with a return statement.
- Class conversions should be checked.
- The security level can be bypassed by the inclusion of native machine code. This code
consists of methods, which have been written in another language. During their execution
control is temporary lost. Native methods ensure no restrictions of the method execution.
They are needed to connect platform specific parts of Java libraries. With the use of such
native code, Java’s portability gets lost [Weg98].
- Shared object libraries cannot be loaded transparently through the network. They must be
installed locally and represent a potential security breach.
To minimise the risk of code manipulation a loader is used.
Verification issues can be thought of on three levels:
• Structure - the verifier checks that the class file is “ structurally sound” at all levels,
• Environment - needs to be aware of the other classes,
• Content - a class file which is structurally and environmentally correct does not guarantee
that it will pass verification.
Verifiers prohibit certain ways of writing code.
Bytecode Verifier and Class Loader are part of the virtual machine.
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3.2.3 The Class Loader

The class loading mechanism reads Java bytecode into the JVM and converts it into classes,
which are then inserted into at least one namespace [Sho96].
If the Class Loader has already loaded this class, the previously defined class object has to be
found and returned. The Security Manager is consulted to see if this program is allowed to
access the class in question. Otherwise the Class Loader must delegate another Class Loader
to find classes that are in the CLASSPATH. Now the Security Manager is consulted to see if
the program is allowed to create the class in question. Depending on the actual policy, the
class file is read into an array of bytes. After the bytecode is run through a Bytecode Verifier,
the bytecode is converted into a class object.
As we saw, the Class Loader works in conjunction with the Security Manager and the Access
Controller.
Security can be achieved by separation of classes using namespaces [Mat97]. A namespace
consists of classes which have the same source. Every loaded class automatically will be
inserted into a namespace [Sho96].
A class is considered local, if it is located in a directory, which has the same value as the
CLASSPATH variable. Otherwise the class is considered non-local and must be somewhere
else in the network, outside of the above mentioned CLASSPATH. While local classes are
located in one namespace, local classes outside the CLASSPATH, are located in other
namespaces.
On his search for certain classes, the loader first looks into the “locar‘ namespace. Only after
that it looks into the other namespaces [Mat97]. Classes with similar names, but different
sources, will be inserted into different namespaces. So they cannot influence each other
[Mid99].
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The package concept enables the collection of classes in local namespaces [Lam98]. In Java,
classes that are member of the same package have certain privileges, that other classes do not
have - they can access all the classes of the package that have the default protection.
The following table gives an overview of possible interactions:

Same class
Same package
Subclass
Same package
non-subclass
Different
package
Subclass
Different
package
non-subclass

Private

No modifier

Yes
No

Protected

Public

Yes
Yes

Private
protected
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Table 3.2: Possible Interactions

The ability to create a class loader is limited to Java applications. Java applets use the Class
Loader provided for them by the browser in which they are running. They are generally
prohibited from creating their own Class Loader [Pri96]. Because classes from multiple sites
could run the risk of classes from different sites interfering with each other.
The Class Loader allows the Security Manager to find out particular information about the
class, which allows the Security Manager to apply the correct security policy depending on
the context of the request [Oak98].
A Class Loader in Java is an object that extends the Class Loader class. While the default
loader is only able to load files from his own file system, other loaders may implement, e.g.
network access, by overloading the default loader.
Other available Class Loader are: the Internal Class Loader, which cannot be overridden, the
Applet Class Loader, the RMI Class Loader, the Secure Class Loader and the URL Class
Loader.
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A way to prevent forgeries would be to require that every class be a signed class. But it would
be unmanageable to require that every site sign and authenticate every class on its site
[Oak98].
A JAR file is just a zip file with some additional information, which provides faster loading of
several classes in a single file than requesting every file trough individual HTTP connections.
JAR files are important because they provide the necessary support for digitally signed
classes.
Java (1.2) class loading follows a delegation model. First, create a Class Loader that is
associated with the given Class Loader. This Class Loader delegates all operations to the
delegate. If the delegate is able to fulfil the operation, this Class Loader takes no action. If that
succeeds, the class returned by the delegate will ultimately be returned by this class [Oak98].
The Class Loader prohibits attacks, which are based on class spoofing [May99]. In general,
“You have to trust the author of your class loader anyway.”

3.2.4 The Security Manager

The goal of the Security Manager is to grant or prevent access according to the amount of
trust the user has in the class, e.g. granting full access to trusted classes and limiting access
when the access is requested from an untrusted class.
The Security Manager can use the Access Controller for most of those decisions and
determine most of the parameters of the Java sandbox. It must ask the class loader where a
particular class came from.
Java applications have no Security Manager, while Java applets have a very strict Security
Manager.
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Remote
Bytecode

Security
Manager

Access
-► Controller

System
-► Fileloader

Figure 3.20: The Components of a security aware Java Application [Tri99]

The

Security Manager is initialised at the

start of a Java program using the

setSecurityManagerO method and cannot be removed during the run. If access to certain
sources is prohibited a Security Exception must be thrown [Mid99]. The try to overwrite the
Security Manager results in a Security Exception as well.
Security exceptions propagate up through all the methods in the thread that made the call;
eventually , the top-most method receives the exception, which causes that thread to exit
[Oak98].
To perform an potentially dangerous operation, the programmer must request the Java API to
perform an operation, the Java API will ask the Security Manager if such an operation is
allowable. If the Security Manager will allow the operation it will complete the operation
and return normally. In the negative case it will throw an exception back to the Java API,
which in turn throws it back to the user.
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The Security Manager can enforce a simple policy for operations, or it can enforce a very
specialised policy. But once the policy is established, it cannot be changed.
The Security Manager controls access to higher-level client resources such as the local file
system and the network [Sho96]. Starting with the JDK 1.2 the access rights are
independently stored from the source code. They can be found in the policy file [Mid99].
The Security Manager allows an fine grained adjustment of access control, e.g. using access
control lists together with JavaSoft’s Appletviewer.
By default, an untrusted class can only open a socket to the machine from which it was
downloaded. This problem can be bypassed by setting up a proxy service that forwards
requests to the third machine, so that the applet only connects to the web server with proxy
service, while the proxy service can connect to the third machine. The same problem can be
solved in a CORBA compliant environment by the use of a Gatekeeper, which has the same
function in a distributed environment.
Any native code that is executed by the virtual machine cannot be protected by the Security
Manager [Mat97]. It is executed by linking a shared library into the virtual machine. This
prevents a untrusted class from linking in such libraries.
In a Java-enabled browser, the Security Manager is always initialised at the start of the
browser. This makes it impossible

for an applet

to set

the Security Manager, while

applications are not restricted in the use of the Security Manager.
By default, in most Java-enabled browsers, untrusted classes are not allowed any sort of file
access, because an untrusted class might: read your password file, overwrite data on your
machine or even could destroy any data in your local filesystem.
While Netscape Navigator, Internet Explorer, and Hot Java all have a default policy that
prevents untrusted classes from all file access, some of them allow the user to configure a
different policy.
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3.2.5 The Access Controller

The Access Controller

is the mechanism that the Security Manager uses to enforce its

protection. It decides whether access to a critical system resource, i.e. access from the core
API to the operating system, should be permitted or denied.
Java applications that run without a Security Manager will not use the Access Controller.
The core Java API never calls the Access Controller unless a Security Manager is in place.
The Access Controller will not be initialised until it is called.
There are no instances of the AccessController class - its constructor is private, so that it
cannot be instantiated.

The Access Controller is built upon four concepts[Oak98]:
•

Code sources

•

Permissions

•

Policies

•

Protection Domains

3.2.5.1 Code Sources

A Code Source can be described as an encapsulation of the location from which certain Java
classes were obtained. It is a simple object that reflects the URL from which a class was
loaded and the keys that were used to sign that class.
Classes that are loaded by the primordial Class Loader do not have a Code Source - these
classes are given permission to perform any operation.
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3.2.5.2 Permissions

An encapsulation of a request to perform a particular operation is a Permission. A Pennission
object represents an actual permission that has been granted to that class. Some Permissions
carry with them one or more actions.
While the JDK 1.1 grants to applets either all rights or no right, the JDK 1.2 allows the use of
arbitraiy Permissions, depending on the source code base or on the signing author [Mid99].
Permissions can serve two roles:
1. Allow the Java API to negotiate access to several resources (files, sockets and so on).
2. Arbitrary Permissions for use within own programs can be created defining the names of
those Permissions as well as the actions that should apply.
There are 11 standard Permissions of the Java API, which can be found in [OAK98].
The Access Controller also gives us a simple method

of granting fine-grained, specific

permissions to specific classes.

3.2.5.3 Policies

A Policy allows changes to the security model for the program without

modifying

the

program’s code.
The Policy encapsulates a mapping between Code Sources and Permission objects in such a
way that classes loaded from particular locations or signed by specific individuals have the set
of specified permissions, see Fig. 3.21.
Like the Security Manager, only a single instance of the Policy class can be installed in the
Virtual Machine at any time. However, unlike the Security Manager , the actual instance of
the Policy class can be replaced.
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Domain A

Domain B

a.class

c.class

d.class

b.class

Permissions
________________ ^

Permissions
________________

Security policy

Figure 3.21: Mapping between Code Sources and Permissions

The Access Controller allows users to customise

the security policy

of a particular

application simply by modifying entries in the java.policy file. As soon as a entry has been
processed it is active. This allows a much more flexible mechanism for determining policies
The default policy file that comes with the Java 1.2, can be found in appendix A2 . This is the
system security file. There is no default file for each user. When no policy file is found, this
file will be loaded.
This policy file may contain an additional keystore entry. This specifies the name of the
URL that will be used to process the keystore in which public keys for the signers listed in
the policy file will be found.
Permissions are defined using the policytool.
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3.2.5.4 Domains

A Protection Domain represents all the Permissions that are granted to a particular Code
Source. A Protection Domain is one grant entry in the policy file. Protection Domains can be
classified in:
•

System Domain

•

Application Domain

While the System Domain is a Protection Domain, which grants permissions to Code Sources
from the system code base, an Application Domain grants permissions to the Code Source
belonging to a certain application, see fig. 3.22.

Appl.

Appl.2

Appl.n

System Domain

Figure 3.22: System Domain and Application Domains

Each class in the Virtual Machine may belong to one and only one Protection Domain, which
is set by the Class Loader when the class is defined.
Classes that are loaded by the primordial Class Loader have no Protection Domain, while
classes that exist as part of the system class path (the Java API classes) have no explicit
Protection Domain.
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Whether the Access Controller allows or rejects a given permission depends upon the set of
Protection Domains that are on the stack when the Access Controller is called.

Stack

Protection Domains

Figure 3.23: The Stack and Protection Domains of a Method [Oak98]

All classes on the stack must have permission for an operation to succeed. The permissions
for any particular operation can be considered to be the intersection of all permissions of
each Protection Domain on the stack when the checkPermission() method is called.
A class can be temporarily given the ability to perform an action on behalf of a class that
might not normally have that ability. This is possible using the beginPrivilegedQ and the
endPrivilegedQ methods, which form a block of code. All code within this block will be
executed as if it had the privileges of the class that called the beginPrivilege() method.
All external resources are available only via the system domain.
A protection domain can grant privileges to code that has called it, but it cannot grant
privileges to code that it calls.

3.2.6 Guarded Objects

A Guarded Object encapsulates the notion of permissions and the Access Controller into a
single object, which is implemented by the GuardedObject class. This class allows you to
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embed another object within it in such a way that all access to the object will first have to
go through the Access Controller, as a guard.

Figure 3.24: Guarded Object [LiG98]

The guard can be any class that implements the Guard interface.

3.2.7 Additional security features

JAVA implements among others the following additional security features:
•

Public Key Cryptography - which is implemented in the Java Cryptography Extension.
Different encryption engines are made available, unfortunately only for US-located users .

•

Secure Socket Layer (SSL) - which is available for all users and has been described in
section 2.2.2.7.
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3.2.8 Problems of Java Security

At the beginning of the Java language, Sun claimed to have found a secure language. Shortly
after that, the first vulnerabilities have been found. One of the most common misconcepts
about Java security holes is to pretend that they are only implementation errors and that the
specification has been sound and complete since day one [McG99]. The source code has
evolved and doubled his size, since the first version of Java has been released,. Naturally, the
specification has evolved too.
Most of the discovered problems have been fixed veiy' quickly and the question if “Java is
save enough to use” has been answered with a clear yes.

Vulnerabilities can be classified into:
•

Inherent vulnerabilities. At the moment there are no inherent vulnerabilities known.

•

Errors in the actual specification. They consist mainly of problems in the Class Loader,
which have been fixed. However, it is hard to determine if a security bug is a specification
problem or an implementation problem.

•

Implementation errors can be classified into two categories:
- Errors in the Virtual Machine (VM) on a server (application). Here, usually the problems
are similar to those encountered in clients.
- Errors in the VM in a client, e.g. in a browser. These errors are the result of the
accelerated release of new browser versions. As an example the Virtual Machine
getSystemResource vulnerability can be mentioned, which allows the reading of local
file information. This vulnerability has been observed in the Internet Explorer 4 [BugOO].

•

Malicious applets can exploit the holes of the Java Security Model. Hostile applets can
process denial of service attacks, copy or delete local information or simply steal Central
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Processing Unit (CPU) time.

As an example can be mentioned an applet that opens

thousands of windows, allocating almost all resources available on that host.
The next big category consists of errors that occur in tools or applications and which used
together with Java imply vulnerabilities:
•

Administrative errors in the used tools. Often capabilities of Java together with
administrative errors in used applications or tools can show the existence of new
vulnerabilities. The “Jumping the Firewall” attack exploits the misconflguration of a
firewall to attack the firewall from inside. A similar vulnerability is the Multiple Firewall
Vendor FTP Client Vulnerability, for details see [BugOO].

•

Errors in used applications or tools. As an example the Netscape Enterprise Server Web
Publishing Vulnerability can be mentioned. The Web Publishing feature is installed with
the Netscape Enterprise Server in the /publisher directory. This directory is accessible by
remote or local users without any authentication. Java applets that remotely administer
the Enterprise Server can be downloaded.

If more security problems are found in the future, they’re likely to be similar to the ones
presented. A chronology of the Java security problems can be found in [McG99] and in the
Bugtrack archive in [BugOO]. Some of these problems have been discussed in [Dip96] too.
An additional problem is

individual object security, which can not be provided if a big

amount of objects need to be protected. This can also apply if a high object volatility is given.
One fundamental problem known, is the protection of an applet from the hosting physical and
virtual machine. This problem is very actual since the existence of Mobile Agent Systems.
MAS will be handled in the next section.
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3.3 Security Problems in Mobile Agent Systems

The Security Management Specification identifies the key security issues and specifies
facilities for securing agent-to-agent communication via the FIPA agent platform. The main
specification [FAM97] does not mandate every FIPA compliant agent platform to support
Agent Security Management.
The Agent Platform Security Manager (APSM) is responsible for maintaining the Agent
Platform Security policy. It is responsible for providing transport-level security and creating
agent audit logs. The APSM is responsible for negotiating the requested Inter- and Intra
domain Security Services with other APSM’s.
The agent platform is in any way considered to be trusted. The AMS may posses a public key
pair and a certificate. Additional the AMS can keep the agent key pair in secure storage.
The Directory Facilitator (DF) can store certificates but should not store private keys, since all
information of the DF are made public. Security risks exist during registration, agent-agent
interaction, agent configuration, agent-agent platform interaction, user-agent interaction and
agent mobility [FSM98].
Agents may request a specific security mechanism, which will fulfil the main security goals
mentioned in section 1.4. The agent platform must be able to convey the security policy it
enforces to other agents.
To maintain accountability platform-level auditing is required.
In the current specifications mobile agent security has not been addressed by the FIPA. A lot
of agent-specific security risks have not yet been identified. The agent-specific paradigm of
non-deterministic intelligent autonomous collaboration gives rise to new security risks
comparable to those known in real world social societies.
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3.3.1 Sources of Mobile Agents Security Problems

Mobile Agent Systems have some additional requirements in comparison to the usual
distributed systems. The main sources of security problems in Mobile Agent Systems are:
•

Mobility is the property of an agent that allows it to travel between agent platforms.

•

Hardware independence - Agents code must not be hardware dependent [Fue98].
Usually, an interpreter will process it.

•

Interaction is the property that allows agents to act with other agents.

•

Autonomy allows agents to make decisions on their own, without having continuous
assistance.

Agent Systems can be classified [Hoh97J in:
•

Closed Systems, where agents can be started only from certain users, services only from
certain parts and the MAS can be used only from one part;

•

Platform-like Systems, where agents can be started from different users of a part. MAS
must be protected from malicious agents.

•

Open Systems, where certain users can start an agent, a service can be user by authorised
parts, and different parts can use the MAS.

In this case mobile agents have to be

protected from malicious MAS.

We will notice here only open systems.

Agent

1

1 1----- ► Agent
▲

Mobile Agent System

P

Agent

||

Agent

A

\

Mobile Agent System

Figure 3.25: Classifying Security Problems [Hoh98]
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Mobile agent’s security problems can be classified as follows:
1 - protecting one agent from another,
2 - protecting agents from malicious mobile agent’s systems,
3 - protecting the mobile agent system from an malicious agent,
4 - protecting one mobile agent system (host) from another mobile agent system (host).

3.3.1.1 Protecting one Agent from Another

In this common situation, the following different attacks are possible:
•

agent manipulation,

•

identity veiling,

•

fraud and denial of service attacks.

3.3.1.2 Protecting Agents from Malicious Mobile Agent’s System (Host)

A malicious server has access to the complete internal state of an agent. Thus software agents
have no hopes of keeping cryptographic key secrets! [Ben97]
JavaSoft’s security architect, Li Gong, notices that producing survivable mobile code is much
more difficult than producing a survivable hosting system that is resistant to attacks by hostile
mobile code. J. Farmer notices in [Far92] that it is impossible to protect agents against read
attacks by the MAS (host). Complete technical solutions are not known. That is the reason
why almost everybody beliefs that it is impossible to prevent agent tampering unless trusted
(and tamper-resistant) hardware is available [Che95]. But there are no rigorous statements
that could be used to verify this statement. Very few technical approaches exist to solve the
problem. A solution to this problem is unlikely [Hoh97]. Nevertheless Sanders/Tschudin have
given a partial solution in [San98].
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The following attacks are possible:
•

reading and changing agent’s data and code,

•

incorrect code execution,

•

host masking,

•

denial of service (execution),

•

communication manipulation by a third party,

•

returning false values.

3.3.1.3 Protecting the Mobile Agent System from an Malicious Agent

Agents need access to system resources, thus access must be controlled. Since the most used
agent language is Java it is possible to define security-policies. Interpreters that have been
used must be protected, i.e, using sandbox security.
The most dangerous attacks are the hidden attacks that can be executed, i.e. by a Trojan
Horse. Chess describes in [Che95] that it is impossible to verify that an arbitrary program is
not a virus.

3.3.I.4. Protecting one Mobile Agent System from another Mobile Agent System

The attacks and countermeasures correspond to those of traditional distributed systems, which
will not be addressed here. Further information can be found in [Bru96].
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3.3.2 Classical Approaches and Specific Problems

The fundamental problem of agent protection has been recognised early by Tomas Sander.
Mobile Agents should be able to run on untrusted computation platforms [San97].
The most classical approaches to provide agent security are listed below:
•

Symmetric encryption uses a common key to encrypt and to decrypt information

•

Asymmetric encryption (public key encryption) uses a pair of keys. Where we can
distinguish between a public key, used to encrypt information and a secret key used to
decrypt information.

•

Digital signatures and certificates are means, which use asymmetric encryption.

•

Partial Result Authentication Code

(PRAC) demonstrates the authenticity of an

intermediate agent state or partial result that resulted from mnning on a server. It ensures
perfect forward integrity. Better than digital signatures since a key loss can make the
authenticity of all signed messages questionable.

3.3.2.1 Symmetric encryption

This technique is almost not usable in Mobile Agent Systems, since secret information, like
secret keys, are hard to protect. The single deployment of symmetric encryption is the Secure
Socket Layer transport encryption between two X.509 certified endpoints (Mobile Agent
Systems).

3.3.2.2 Asymmetric encryption

To show the limitation of the applicability of asymmetric encryption, we defined the model of
an information-gathering agent [Ste99]. This model uses only public key cryptography. The
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goal of this agent is to gather information of a certain type. The gathered information is
encrypted using the agent’s owner’s public key, which is carried along by the mobile agent.
This key can be certified using a X.509 compliant certificate. On every host from a Mobile
Agent System the new information ‘T” is gathered and encrypted using the public key KpubThese encrypted information Kpub(I) can be stored in the agent or sent to the owner directly.
Nobody will be able to read this information except the person owning the corresponding
secret key KsecIf our agent reaches an untrusted platform, the malicious host will not be able to read the
gathered information.

Agent
Knowledge Base

Info =Kpriv(Kpub(Info))

Public Key Kpub
Kpub(Information from Node 1)
Kpub(Information from Node2)

Agent Platform Node 2

Figure 3.26: Gathering Agent

The advantages of the model are on the hand: for the first no Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
is needed and the any hosts can not evaluate the gathered information.
This advantage is a disadvantage if we want to improve our model. At the moment agents are
only doing simple works, like gathering information. No special knowledge is therefor
necessary. Imagine the case of agents dealing with gathered information. In this case agents
must be able to read the gathered information without revealing it to a malicious host.
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We can identify at least the following problems:
•

Protection versus use of the agent’s knowledge base. Using classical encryption methods
we can guarantee integrity, by signing the “knowledge base”. This can protect the agent’s
knowledge base from being “brainwashed”. But we can not protect it from being copied.
Further our agent would not be able to learn, i.e. to add new rules to the encrypted
knowledge base.

•

Protection versus access of gathered information. In our model the agent can gather
information protecting them from malicious hosts. After that our agent is not able to
evaluate these data, since it can not carry the owners private key. Still denial of service
attacks can be performed.

3.3.2.3 Digital Signatures and Certificates

Digital signatures and certificates use asymmetric encryption. The above mentioned
weaknesses have direct implications on them and impose limitations. The use of digital
certificates, which should be X.509 compliant, usually supposes the existence of a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI).

3.3.2.4 Partial Result Authentication Code (PRAC)

The following methods of PRAC can be distinguished [Ben97]:
•

Simple Message Authentication Code (MAC)-based PRAC
Agents using PRAC need a list of secret PRAC keys. One key per visited server will be
used. Before leaving, the agent summarises the partial results from its stay in a message,
which is send back to the dispatcher. Using the actual key the MAC on this message is
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computed. This provides integrity. Before migrating to the next server the actual PRAC
key is erased from the list.
•

MAC-based PRAC’s with one-way Functions.
In this version a single key is used. Additionally a m-bit to m-bit one-way function is
needed. This will generate our next keys. The procedure is the same as above. Before the
transfer to the next server, kj+i = f ( kj) is generated, kj is used to summarise the partial
results and afterwards will be deleted. The new key ki+i will be transferred together with
the agent to the next host. A (m-r) bits one-way function, where r<m, can be used to
increase security.

The above mentioned means are partial solutions, which do not allow our agent to learn, i.e. it
is not possible to protect dynamic changing code and data.

3.3.3 Non-Classical Approaches and Specific Problems

One of the most challenging problems is the malicious host problem i.e. the protection of
mobile agents from malicious hosts (MAS). The next approaches will have the goal of hiding
functionality.
Many interesting ideas have been checked, hoping to find a solution to the problem. Ken
Thomson was one of the firsts that had the idea of veiling information using a self-changing
program [Tho84]. If changes are made at program level (bugs), they will be hard to detect, if
changes will be made at microcode level it will be even harder.

Microcode changes will be

almost impossible to detect.
An approach to solve the problem based on a similar idea comes from the Fritz Hohl from the
University of Stuttgart. The result is an approach called Code Mess Up. It combines the
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dynamic generation of a new and far less understandable version of the agent with lifetime
restriction of the agent’s code and data [Hoh97].
In a detailed attack analysis it has been shown that most of the security problems can be
solved, if the host (MAS) is not able to determine the relation between single lines of code
and their semantics and the relation between memory bits and the semantics of data elements.
Code can only be manipulated in a direct manner, if the attacker knows what each line of code
does exactly and where this line is stored.
Every code can be broken if there is enough time for crypt-analysis. The Code Mess Up
method restricts this amount of time by introducing a lifetime for code and data. Before every
migration the platform, which hosts the agent, constructs a new form of the agent code which
does exactly the same as the one before, but which „looks different“, i.e. has another
structure.
If a malicious host makes changes, they will generate not predictable effects and will lead to a
denial of service attack.
The next step was the mess up code in a structured way. In this case the variable
recomposition is used. This approach mixes the content of variables. (A similar method,
whieh mixes keys, has been developed for classical distributed Systems in [Kes99].)
But even this approach does not offer a reliable solution.

Security is a key factor for the applicability of mobile agent systems. In open systems a high
level of security for intelligent mobile agent is hard to guarantee. Even the FIFA has not yet
considered the mobile factor. In the FIFA model any agent has to trust the mobile agent
system he is on.
Since mobile agent’s systems security requirements are very application- specific, in reality
only a few traditional security mechanisms have been implemented in mobile agent systems.
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3.4 Generic Problems

During the comparison of the security problems in three areas (CORBA, Java and Mobile
Agents), the following generic problems have been identified:
•

Distributed objects are part of a dynamic system, which is continually changing.

•

Security at object level cannot be guaranteed if a high object volatility and a large object
population exists.

•

The used services must also be secure.

•

Integrity protected messages will limit the type of interoperability .

•

Firewalls are not able to identify and control the flow of application specific traffic.

•

It is impossible to verify that an arbitrary program is not a virus.

•

General problem: It is not possible to protect software that is running on a malicious host.

Most of the above mentioned problems can be solved. However there are a few problems that
have not been solved yet, e.g. the last problem.
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4. Solutions and Implementations
4.1 Solutions using firewalls
4.1.1 The General Classical Solution
4.1.1.1 Problems

The main categories which endanger our systems are:
the variety of network services,
the loss of confidence and integrity,
conceptual errors and
the misuse of free available information.
The most important attacks are caused by conceptual errors like:
• Address spoofing: Simulating trustworthy addresses we can reach the internal
network without problems. Simple packet filters offer no protection against this
problem. Usually application gateways provide no protection either.
• Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) attacks can be executed using “redirecf‘
packets to change routing tables. Another possibility is to perform an „denial of
service,, attack, falsifying „destination unreachable,, or „time to live exceed,, packets.
ICMP packets can be filtered by packet filters.
• Internet Routing Attacks: By evaluating source routing information, an attacker can
learn something about the internal network. This kind of attack can be defended by
the use of static routing. Dynamic routing should be turned off.
• Flooding: This is still a danger for application gateways and packet filters.
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4.1.1.2 Implementation

Using the active firewall components that have been described, a high level security firewall
system can be build. With two packet filters a screened sub-net called Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) can be defined. This solution can offer top level security, resulting in more security
than the addition of the security of each firewall component. The weakness of one
component has no impact on the security of the other components. This concept has a
nested security structure. The first packet filter will block everything except the available
services in the public area and the services from the internal network that are available for
external user.

Figure 4.1:High Level Security Firewall System with Demilitarised Zone (DMZ)

The application gateway and the second packet filter have to pass only the authorised traffic
between the internal and external network. The second packet filter protects the application
gateway from attackers operating from the internal network.
The management of active firewall components is located in the internal network. Services
like WWW and FTP that should be available for the external users, will be offered by
servers positioned in the public area. Attacks on these servers will not endanger the
internal network.
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The use of mail services require a SMTP proxy on the application gateway. This proxy
will receive mails from external mail servers and forward them to the internal mail
server and vice versa. There are two possible solutions for the DNS, the split DNS and the
DNS proxy. As a recommendation from professional hackers a

uninteresting computer

should be installed in the public area, as a “playground“, just for hacking [Rei98].

4.1.2 Firewalls and CORBA (2.2)

4.1.2.1 Problems

The main problem in classical solutions is the fact that there is no standard mechanism for a
firewall to identify and control the flow of HOP traffic is .
At the beginning CORBA communication used proprietary, socket based protocols. The use
of filters represented no problem. Since CORBA has implemented the Internet Inter ORB
Protocol (HOP) a lot of problems have arisen. They will be addressed in the next lines
[OMF98]:
1. It is not possible to know in advance which ports will be used for CORBA com
munication. CORBA is a very dynamic system.
2. Addressing an object behind a firewall is an other problem. Clients might attempt to
contact servers directly, which won’t work if the firewall is not configured to allow traffic
on the ports used. Not knowing about the presence of a firewall, usually the client will be
unable to contact the server. The OMG specifies firewalls with no transparency.
3. It is very difficult to configure firewalls on the server side to listen for IlOP-bearing
connections on all ports.
4. Traffic must be able to pass a chain of different firewalls types.
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5. The Callback problem (only CORBA 3.0): If a server object wants to invoke an operation
on a client object, the server has to make a TCP Connect to the client (as HOP until
version 1.1 is unidirectional at transport level). While a domain firewall configuration
may permit a few selected inside server host to be target of outside HOP traffic, it would
be very unusual for a firewall configuration to allow any inside workstation to be the
target

of an incoming TCP connection. This is not acceptable for inter-domain

communication. The problem of addressing an object behind a firewall also applies to
callback objects [Sch99].
6. A CORBA firewall must be able to handle encrypted communication. When SSL is used
to protect the HOP communication. HOP firewall traversal must allow SSL/HOP traffic.

4.1.2.2 Firewalls

Firewall processing HOP must permit outside access to inside CORBA-based application
services, and must prevent access to HOP-based services that should not be accessible from
the outside.
Three different types of firewalls have been addressed in the OMG Firewall Specification,
which solve most of the above listed problems:
1. TCP Proxy Firewalls. TCP Proxies are very simple transport level firewalls, which
provide a much higher level of protection than packet filter. A TCP proxy “rewrites” the
connect between client and server - now there is a TCP Connect between client and
proxy, and another between proxy and server [Sch99]. The server lOR for clients outside
the server enclave must contain the firewall socket. The lOR can be proxifled manually.
As an example the plug-gw component of the TIS Firewall Kit can be used as a CORBA
firewall
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2. SOCKS Proxy Firewalls. SOCKS is a transport level proxy mechanism, which have
been defined in RFC 1928. It is a client configured proxy. Socks consists of a SOCKS
proxy server on the firewall and a client-side library. Additional to authentication SOCKS
maps TCP connects. Socksified CORBA client objects can use normal lORs without
proxification [Sch99]. Further details about SOCKS can be found in [SOC98] and
[OMF98].
3. GIOP Proxy Firewalls. A GIOP proxy relays GIOP messages. It checks if messages
conform to the security policy, sends it to the server object, logs the request, checks the
validity of the GIOP message received by clients or can apply a more finely grained
filter based on the message header. Only GIOP proxies have the possibility to examine the
HOP SSL traffic. Two possible techniques can be applied:
•

the pass-through technique, where the traffic passes unhindered and unexamined the
firewall. The proxy has no visibility to the encrypted byte stream. It is not possible
to verify that the valid HOP traffic is flowing after the pass-through connection has
been established. Using SSL the integrity of the client server connection is maintained.

•

the normal technique, during which the encrypted byte stream can be decrypted and
HOP messages via SSL can be examined.

In both cases the communication participants will be authenticated using the X.509
certificates. Further, the CORBA 3.0 specification will include callback functionality for this
type of proxy.
The Joint Revised Submission

CORBA/Firewall Security does not address the use of

SECIOP as a transport mechanism for secure invocations.
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4.1.2.3 Solutions

The ORB based communication through firewalls is at the moment limited by the problems
presented.
New solutions require modifications in the HOP. The OMG specification adds to CORBA
new elements that provide clients, firewalls, and servers the information needed for flexible,
efficient, controlled firewall traversal.
Solving the problems mentioned in section 4.1.2.1:
The problems 1-3 can be solved using Interoperable References (lOR). lORs contain
information needed to contact an objects firewall directly. A firewall can have one host/port
address that clients directly use to contact the firewall that protects the object that it wishes to
communicate with. lOR make only sense if they are used together with a naming service or
with a external trader. The definition of standard ports for HOP (port 683) and for IIOP-SSL
(port 684) can facilitate communication through TCP proxy firewalls [OMF98].
The above solution is based on non-transparency. A better solution would be the concept of
transparent firewalls, which has been defined by Schreiner in [Sch99].
To solve the problem no. 4 it is necessary to extend the lOR with infonuation that address
firewalls. Additionally, lORs have profile data, that direct clients to proxies. Further three
types of tags, corresponding to the basic firewall types (TCP - proxy, SOCKS - proxy and
GIOP - proxy), have been introduced. Clients can use an IDL interface to invoke operations
on GIOP objects to provide information about desired proxy behaviour. They will improve
different firewall chain traversals.
Problem no. 5 can be solved in two ways:
•

change to the bidirectional-GIOP which allows requests in both directions in one TCP
Connect. But this solution raises very serious security problems, e.g. the client side
cannot deny access as there is no new negotiation and context establishment. In most
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cases it is impossible to deny incoming Callbacks at the firewall. Worse, it is unclear
which objects on the client are now accessible from the server.
•

Use a GIOP proxy at the client-side too. A Callback is like a normal request in opposite
direction (from server to client). However this allows security enforcement on client side.

Problem no. 6 can be solved using GIOP proxies or even bi-directional GIOP proxies,
whereby a single client-initiated connection can be reused by the target server to carry HOP
traffic for server invocations on client side Callback objects. In this case no foregoing server
contact is needed.
GIOP Proxy could be part of a firewall or could be deployed as a proxy server behind a
firewall, that performs only simple filtering of HOP traffic. Since HOP is not a well known
protocol, ports have been defined in the Firewall specification.
CORBA communication through filters and “stateful inspection” firewalls have been analysed
in [Sch99]. As a result non of them are able to offer a bit of security when used e.g. with
HOP.
Additional to the solutions mentioned, HTTP-tunnelling is often used. This “interim solution”
has its origins in the beginning of CORBA communication, when no GlOP-proxies where
available. This is an other possibility to get an IlOP-connection through the firewall. But it
has a big disadvantage. There is no flow control at HOP level ! The only control is at transport
level (TCP port 80 (HTTP)). When possible GlOP-proxies should be used !

4.1.2.4 Implementations

Up to new there are only two GIOP proxy implementation known;
1. Wonderwall was the first full featured GIOP proxy implementation on the market. It has
been developed by IONA and is oriented on lONAs ORB implementation (Orbix).
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Checkpoint incorporated this proxy in their Firewall-1 product. Firewall-1 is at the
moment the de facto standard on the firewall market..
2. Gatekeeper is an IlOP-proxy which has been developed by Inprise, former Black Widow.
This solution is able to pass the secured messages through so there is no direct security
integration needed. This is possible since only the HOP message and not the HOP headers
are secured. In fact it works like an “HOP Router”. Additionally the gatekeeper supports
HOP-tunneling over HTTP.
At the moment for the use of Inprise’s Visibroker behind a firewall, the developers
recommend the use of a HTTP tunnel [Bez99] or alternatively HTTPS.
The concept of interceptors, which are gateways at request level, are another alternative. They
support the integration of new security mechanisms. They have been implemented in ORBs
like Mico and JacORB. Up to now the interceptor concept has not been specified in the
CORBA standard. The SSL-Client Server example from Appendix A4 uses interceptors.

4.1.3

Firewalls and Java

4.1.3.1

Problems

Java is considered to be a secure programming language. There are at least three different
types of communications, which can be used in Java:
•

Socket-Based Communication. Java’s basic communication is mainly socket based

•

Remote Method Invocations (RMI). Remote Method Invocation is a “pure” Java
communication, which is not CORBA compliant.

•

HOP-based Communication. Java programs can be used as a front-end in CORBA
systems. The integration of Java programs into the CORBA system requires HOP-based
communication.
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Getting these ways of communications through firewalls is one of the major problems, which
gets harder if the communication is additionally secured.
Since Java Code is characterised by mobility, the problem of malicious Java Code must be
addressed in context with firewalls.

4.1.3.2

Solutions

The communication through a firewall can be solved in the ways below:
•

Socket based communication is no problem for filter and SOCKS.

•

Getting RMI communication through a firewall is a little bit more complicated. Using
RMI the client-server communication can be achieved in three different ways[RMI99]:
1. The client can communicate directly with the server using sockets.
2. If the socket communication fails, then build a URL to the server’s host and port and
use an HTTP POST request on that URL, sending the information to the skeleton as
the body of the POST. If successful , the result of the POST is the skeleton’s response
to the stub.
3. If this also fails, build an URL to the server’s host using port 80, the standard HTTP
post, using a CGI script that will forward the posted RMI request to the server.
If one of these techniques succeeds, this technique will be used for all future
communication with the server.
Usually in the following cases RMI can pass a firewall:
•

Socket communication on a fixed port. But if the client is in the Intranet behind a
firewall and the server is in the Internet the problem of a remote RMI server using
random TCP/IP port number can arise. The client will connect to a fixed TCP/IP port
of the remote server, which will generate a random port number for client (after initial
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connection handshaking has been completed). To allow RMI connections, the firewall
rules must allow out-bound traffic for any port ! This solution is too risky !
•

Communication tunnelled through HTTP (port 80 or 8080).

The use of filters can pass RMI communication through, but has no content control.
Therefor a proxy should be implemented.
To “build a bridge” between RMI and CORBA RMI over HOP [Aki99] has been
specified. Solutions for HOP have been described in section 4.1.2.2. A RMI over HOP
extension exists also for Enterprise Java Beans 1.1.
•

HOP based communication can pass firewalls by using filters, SOCKS, GlOP-proxies
(HOP-proxies) and HTTP-tunnelling. For details see section 4.1.2.2.

Usually, SSL based communication uses fixed socket communication and can pass firewalls
without problems. If SSL over HOP uses the port 684 specified in the OMG’s firewall
specification then firewall passage is no problem. If random ports are used a GlOP-proxy is
required.
Hostile Java Applets with unrestricted socket privileges hold dangers for firewalls that allow
unrestricted outbound connections[Sho96]. When a “cracklef’ comes across a firewall
through a proxy and runs, it could try to open a socket back across the firewall. If it succeeds,
the cracklet could start “war-dialing” behind the firewall, checking for interesting information
and forwarding it to a host in the outside world.
Malicious Java Code can be checked by a firewall (scanner), that executes the code in a
sandbox. Since this scan-process costs resources it would be a good idea to distribute tasks
on different machines. The Open Platform for Security (OPSEC) framework developed by a
association of over 200 companies (including Check Point) allows the distribution of different
tasks on different machines. Thus the firewall will delegate the scan of an applet to a separate
machine, which is located in a protected environment (e.g. Intranet).
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From the Internet
unverified data

verified data
To the Intranet
Figure 4.2: The Content Vectoring Protocol (CVP)

Therefor it uses the Content Vectoring Protocol (CVP). The Content Vectoring Protocol
(CVP) defines a asynchronous Interface to a server, which verifies the data. This process is
transparent. After a successful scan, the applet and the result of the scan will be transferred to
the firewall. The firewall will decide if the applet should reach his target or not.

4.1.4 Firewalls and Mobile Agent Systems

4.1.4.1 Problems

The protocols discussed here are used to transfer mobile agents from one host to another.
Since Mobile Agent Systems are mainly implemented in Java, a part of the problems
mentioned in the previous section can be found here. The most important communication
methods are outlined below:
•

Email based Communication. This kind of communication is characteristic for older
MAS[Lug99], e.g. D’Agents.

•

Remote Method Invocation. RMI uses Java’s Security Manager which supports the
control of behaviour. This enables Java to support the implementation of agent systems
using RMI. Years ago, many authors thought that RMI “will die from neglecf’ [Mor98],
now the simplicity of RMI has been combined with the universality of CORB A.
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•

IlOP-based

Communication. It is needed because of

CORBA compliant MAS

implemented in Java. The OMG’ s MASIF specification [MAS97] does not specify the
protocol used to transfer agents, it can be e.g. Remote Procedure Call (RPC) or HOP.
•

Socket-based Communication. The majority of MAS use socket-based communication.

An important problem is also the secure agent transfer.

4.1.4.2 Solutions

The Mobile Agent idea was bom many years ago. One of the first MAS used the Email
Infrastructure. But this has turn out to be an inflexible approach. However the security
problems are identical with those of the usual mail systems, e.g. sendmail. The integration in
a firewall-based security system arise no major problems, see section 4.1.1.2.
The RMI related problems which arise at firewall traversals have been outlined and solved in
section 4.1.3.2.
HOP based Mobile Agent Systems, like Grasshopper are conform with the MASIF Standard.
All the problems encountered with HOP and firewalls have been discussed in section 4.1.2.2.
Most MAS have a socket-based communication, e.g. IBM Aglets use the Agent Transport
Protocol (ATP), which offers a simple and platform independent protocol for transferring
agents between network computers. The ATP is an application-level protocol for distributed
agent-based systems, which has the port 434 assigned for it (accordingly to RFC 1700). On
certain systems, this port number is only available for application with system or root
privileges. On those systems, the suggested port number is 10434 [ATP97].
A firewall system can pass without problems socket-based communication, which uses a
fixed socket. If the socket number is varying then only HTTP-tunnelling can help to pass the
agent through the firewall. ATP supports socket-based communication and HTTP-tunnelling.
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HTTP-tunnelling has some limitations. Because the firewall allows only a one-way
connection to the outside, the dispatched aglet cannot fetch a class on demand. All necessary
classes have to be stored in a Java archive file (JAR).
It is impossible for an aglet to dispatch itself back into the intranet through the firewall. To
get back inside a firewall, an aglet uses the retract primitive, which lets a client “pull” the
dispatched aglet from a remote site.
To secure agent transfers MAS often use the SSL protocol. Sometime in combination with
HOP and sometimes without HOP. The ATP does not protect agent transfers. It uses only
locally policies to enforce security.
A FIPA-compliant MAS implementation was not available during this thesis.

4.1.5

Conclusions

A lot of problems have been generated by the false approach used by the OMG in their
firewall specification. The mistake relies in the fact that the goal of the specification was not a
transparent firewall [Sch99] !
Another generic omnipresent problem is the dynamic system, which uses random ports during
its client-server communication. This problem has been solved using GlOP-proxies. But at the
moment a interim solution is the tunnelling of communication protocols (e.g. RMI, HOP) over
HTTP.
Another approach consists in the definition of fixed ports for HOP and SSL/HOP in the
OMG’s Firewall Specification. This will be integral part of the CORBA 3.0 specification.
All three basic technologies analysed use almost the same protocols. Thus they have at least
partially the same problems.
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4.2 Solutions at Application Level

4.2.1 The Security Criteria

The analysis of security features requires the existence of analysis criteria. The following
criteria have been selected and are based on section 1.4:
•

Authentication,

•

Access Control,

•

Confidentiality,

•

Integrity,

•

Accountability - Non-repudiation,

•

Availability.

The definitions of the above criteria can be found in section 1.4.

4.2.2 CORBA Security

4.2.2.1 Implementations

Starting from 1997 at least nine vendors, including IBM and Visigenic have announced
products conforming to the CORBA Security specification. Now at the beginning of the year
2000 there are only a few which succeeded, see figure 4.3.
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Product

Platforms Security Efforts

Security

Supported

Mechanisms

ORBs

C5 Security

DCE plus

Orbix

C++

NT

Authentication,

Service

DASCOM

Visibroker

Java

Solaris

Delegation, Access

HP-UX

Control, Encryption,

AIX

Data Integrity, Audit

Languages

1999/2000

ACL manager

Trails, Single Login,
Sec. Admin., Security
Gatew., Secure Browser
Integration, SSL/Public
Key.
DASCOM

DCE plus

Orbix

C++

NT

Same as C5, excepting:

Intraverse

DASCOM

Visibroker

Java

Solaris

Sec. Gatew. (X.509-

HP-UX

DCE),

AIX

no SSL,

ACL manager

private Keys,
including DCE.
Gradient

DCE

C++

NT

Visibroker

Java

Solaris

Peerlogic

Security

C++

NT

No single login.

Sesame

Service

Java

Solaris

Public & Private Key,

Netcrusader
Peerlogic

Same as DASCOM.

Orbix

hardwired

Sesame.

to DAIS

Figure 4.3: CORBA Security Service Implementations available at the End of 1999.
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Peerlogic DAIS is the only manufacturer with real CORBA conformance security, including
comprehensive policy based administration tools. But the Security Services are “hardwired”
with the DAIS ORB.
Wide propagated ORBs have been produced by IONA and Visigenic.
IONA has implemented her own OrbixSecurity, which is DCE based and which has reached
CORBA Level 1. This means that it is good enough for systems that have modest security
requirements. They provide multithreading, encryption and bind protection.
In the appropriate future IONA will integrate Concepts’s (C5) public key based security
service in its new C3 architecture.
OrbixWeb is an other solution which, offers only encryption and authentication. The SSL
implementation is part of the Orbix OTM Package.
The Visibroker will use

the CORBA Security Services Implementation delivered from

Concepts. This Implementation corresponds with the CORBA Security Conformance Level 2.
Additonal Visigenic has released an SSL interface. A SSL-client-server example, can be
found in Appendix A4.

Authentication

The CORBA Security Services take care of authenticating the client and targets using secure
mechanisms that do not expose critical information, such as passwords. They use client
credentials and principals, for details see section 3.1.1.1. Additional, public key based
authentication is provided by SSL.
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Access Control

Access can be controlled using different mechanisms. The main mechanism has been
delivered by the CORBA Security Service and uses the well known credentials. Access is
controlled using the initiators authenticated attributes which can be retrieved from the
received credentials. Additional access possibilities can use:
•

Name and password,

•

Smart cards,

•

Locally stored X.509 certificates,

•

Access Control Lists (ACLs),

•

Role based logins.

Confidentiality

Usually, confidentiality can be achieved by the use of encryption techniques. The most
important of them have been presented in section/chapter 2.2.2. CORBA supports different
encryption mechanisms (e.g. RSA, DES, MD5). The use of

the GSS-API allows the

integration of different new security mechanisms.
If CORBA security is used, then client and server agree on a certain security mechanism. This
is done during the association (binding). In future implementations information about
available security mechanisms will be available in the lOR.
The level of security provided depends on the used encryption key length. While the usual
symmetric key length of 128 bit is considered safe enough for the Internet, the used
asymmetric key length should have a length of around 3000 bit.
Additional, encryption is provided by the Secure Socket Layer.
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Integrity

Integrity can be achieved by the use of the CORBA Security Service which uses hash
functions (e.g. MD5). Usually, these hash-functions are used together with encryptionfunctions. This offers integrity and confidentiality.

Accountability

Non-Repudiation is a special case of accountability. Up to 1999 most of the CORBA Security
Service (CSS) manufacturer had no Security Service that guaranteed non-repudiation. As we
saw in section 3.1.1.8, the specification of the CSS is incomplete. The Non-repudiation
service does not include:
•

data processing,

•

specification of a delivery service

•

non-repudiation policy processing interface

•

standard token for interoperability

The use of the ISO Non-Repudiation Model, which in fact extends the CSS Non-Repudiation
Model, will solve the problem.
The most convenient technology upon which to implement Non-Repudiation is the public
key technology.

Availability

The CORBA Security Services are transparently available for security unaware application.
Security aware application require the intervention of the software developer, which will
integrate new security mechanism in the application.
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At the moment, most of the ORBs have security services which are not compliant to the
CORBA 2.0 specification. Only Peerlogie claims to have a solution which should comply
with the specification [OSV98].

4.2.2.2 Solutions

Experience shows that a fully functional

and manageable

security integration up to

Conformance Level 2 can take several years.
There are two approaches to implement CORBA security, which does not exclude each other:
•

the implementation of the CORBA Security Services, described in [OSV98], An overview
has been given in figure 4.3.

•

the use of interceptor technology, which enables security services to be integrated into
their ORB [Cav99]. It simplifies security integration in an ORB for: authentication,
authorisation, auditing, encryption and data integrity. Most of the ORB manufacturer
provide interceptor technology, e.g. IONA, Visigenic. At the moment Visibroker from
Visigenic offers the best interceptor technology. Non-standard interceptor technology in
different ORBs does not guarantees secure Inter-ORB communication [Cav99].

Many of the problems issued in sections 3.1.4, 3.1.4.1 and 3.1.4.2 are problems that require a
great effort to be solved. Some of theses problems will be subject to specification reviews
(e.g. securing other CORBA services like the time service and the naming service). The
CORBA 3.0 specification will solve a part of theses problems.

The problems left will be discussed here:
1. A large object population, a high connectivity with large number of secure associations or
a too volatile object population are reasons for a too large overhead [OSV98] at object
level security. This leads also to complex administration..
146

A reduction of the overhead can be achieved by choosing the right security policy granularity.
The use of roles reduces the complexity of the different security policies to be enforced. This
simplifies administration and security management.

2. Integrity protected messages will limit the type of interoperability bridge that can be used.
Any bridge that changes the protected part of the message after it has been integrity or
confidentiality protected will cause the security check at the target to fail [OSV98].
The above problem can be solved using suitable security gateways to reprotect the messages.
Such gateways can translate between different protection mechanisms, e.g. between SSL and
DCE or between X.509 and DCE identities (implemented by IONA).

3. Filtering and routing of audit records, as well as audit reporting or analysis tools are
missing in the actual specification.
This can be solved using the audit trail management of management systems, like HP Open
View.

4. At the moment there are no restrictions concerning installation and distribution of
software in a CORE A compliant system. So everybody can install objects that have some
malicious payload in addition to the functionality known by users.
The use of network and system management software (e.g. IBM’s Tivoli), which is CORE A
compliant, can handle the problems.

5. The following architectural problem can be mentioned: The underlying operating system,
software and hardware are part of the distributed TCB^. It is possible to bypass COREA

^ All the components which are responsible for security enforcement are called distributed trusted
computing base (TCB) [OSV98].
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security at lower level by changing the operating system, software or hardware
components. The same may apply to the used security mechanisms. This is considered to
be one of the fundamental problems of computer science [LAN97]. An approach to this
problem will be presented in section 4.2.3.2.

3.2.2.3 Further Recommendations

•

For the longevity of code make use of the interfaces defined.

•

Use CORBASec compliant security services !

•

Goal is to buy more standard components and develop only components which must be
customised. Try to avoid special purpose security integration work.

•

For security aware applications use only own security services implementations if you
have access to the ORB sources or if Interceptors have been implemented in the ORB.
(DASCOM - William Z.Pope)

•

For security unaware applications only the security services must be implemented. Up to
now the most of the ORBs don’t have security services integrated yet.

•

Do not get to attached to a specific ORB product.

•

Due to the incompatibility of the products in the market, if possible use a single ORB
[Cav99] .
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4.2.3 Java

4.2.3.1 Implementation

At the moment different Java (Virtual Machine) implementations exist. The most widespread
JVM implementation comes from JavaSoft (Sun). Microsoft has also implemented Java, but as
expected this version is not compliant with Suns JVM. We will concentrate here on Suns
JVM included in the Java Development Kit (JDK) version 1.2.
The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) has been also implemented in Java. The most important SSL
toolkits have been implemented by Baltimore, Phaos and JCP.

Authentication

The JDK 1.2 security model has a fine-grained authorisation. Additional security mechanisms
implemented in Java, e.g. SSL, can provide authentication mechanisms. In SSL during the
first step, authentication is processed using X.509 certificates. Further, Enterprise Java Beans
uses declarative authoring attributes, which leads to role based authentication [MonOO].

Access Control

Access Control is one of the strengths of Java. Java handles security via the security manager
object, which passes judgement on all security-sensitive actions, such as opening files and
network connections. The Access Controller is used to enforce the policies handled by the
Security Managers. The standard

Java mechanism requires the installation of a security

manager before exporting any server object or invoking any method on a server.

149

Access control lists, one of the first security mechanisms of Java, are still available. Another
possibility to control access to an object is to guard that object, for details see section 3.2.6.

Confidentiality

To provide confidentiality it is necessary to use the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE). Due
to US-export restrictions, this extension is not available in Europe. The JCE contains among
else encryption engines (Public Key Cryptography), which can be used to guarantee data
confidentiality. Encryption engines can be found in software packages like Cryptix, which
again are subject to US-export controls.
Additionally, SSL provides encryption between two Java applications.

Integrity

Integrity requires the use of hash functions like MD5, which have been implemented in Java.
Another possibility to provide integrity is to use signed classes (JDK 1.2).

Accountability

Non-repudiation as the most important case of accountability is not available in Java. Only if
the Java program is part of a CORBA system (e.g. frontend), then non-repudiation can be
guaranteed by the CORBA system.
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Availability

Availability attacks are in fact denial of service attacks. Such attacks can:
•

allocate large amounts of memory

•

open thousands of windows

•

create high priority processes/threads

Availability attacks are much harder to prevent then the usual attacks. Java has no current
limitation to prevent the allocation of all the memory available or the creation of thousands
of windows.

4.2.3.2 Solutions

Most of the errors specified in 3.2.8. have been solved in a relative short time by the release
of different new patches.
Java’s security concept is not adequate formal. It is based only on textual descriptions
(concerns the bytecode loader and class loader definition). New

security breaches are

foreseeable. Malicious applets will then exploit the holes of the Java Security Model.
However, the JDK 1.2 delivers a powerful security concept, so that most of the possible
attacks have their reason in administrative errors. Administrative errors can lead to the
following attacks [Ban95]:
•

Integrity attacks are attacks which damage or modifying data. This can happen by
deletion/modification of files, modification of the memory currently in use or killing
processes/threads.

•

Disclosure attacks transfer sensitive information, e.g. /etc/passwd or important files, to the
attacker.
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All the above mentioned attacks can be prevented by the proper use of the access control
capabilities existing in Java (e.g. the security manager).
Security policy with too much restrictions

means useless applets, but too little means

potentially dangerous ones.
A fundamental problem left unsolved is the protection of an applet from the hosting physical
and virtual machine. An approach to this problem can be found in section 4.2.3.2.

4.2.3.3 Further Recommendations

Find below recommendations how to write secure Java code. This rules are based on Ed
Feltens twelve rules published in [McG99]. However not all rules make sense in a
heterogeneous distributed system.
•

Make as much as possible variables private (only where it makes sense).

•

Limit access to your classes, methods and variables

•

Make everything final unless there’s a good reason not to.

•

Don’t depend on package scope (or package security).

•

Don’t use inner classes. Inner classes are translated by the compiler into ordinary classes
that happen to be accessible to any code in the same package.

•

If you must sign code, put it all in one archive file

•

Make your classes nonclonable. If your defining a clone method make it final.

•

Make your classes nonserialisable ! This will protect the internal state of your code from
an adversary. This is useful only in a pure Java client server system. If your Java code is
part of a distributed CORBA compliant system, serialisation is needed for persistent
object storage. In this case this recommendation makes no sense !

•

Make classes nondeserialisable ! This makes sense only in systems where persistent object
storage is not needed.
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•

Don’t compare classes by name, compare class objects ! Because there can be multiple
elasses with the same name in a JVM.

•

Secrets stored in your code won’t protect you, they are completely aceessible to anybody
that runs your code.

5.2.4

Mobile Agent Systems

4.2.4.1 Implementations

In the last year many mobile agent systems have been defined and implemented. The variety
goes from simple mail-oriented agents to CORBA-compliant agents. Find below (figure 4.4)
an extract of the Mobile Agent Systems with most evolved security mechanisms. A huge list
of mobile agent systems can be found in [LisOO].
Most of the mobile agent systems are implemented in Java, since Java has been written to
provide code mobility.
During the evaluation no FIFA compliant implementation was available. Tested scenarios
using Mobile Agent Systems (e.g. IBMs Aglets) can be found in Appendix A5.

IBM Aglets Workbench
The Aglets Workbench concentrates on two from the four main security problems concerning
Mobile Agent Systems. It handles the protection of aglets from

other aglets and the

protection of hosts from malicious aglets.
This Mobile Agent System uses a fine-grained authorisation similar to the JDK 1.2 security
model. Access to the file system, network, and other aglets is controlled by the aglet security
manager.
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A host needs to ensure that an aglet does not compromise its security. Aglets which are
loaded from the local filesystem are considered to be trusted and can create other trusted
aglets. All other aglets are treated as untrusted aglets. The decision to trust an aglet is entirely
up to the host
The communication between aglet servers within a domain is integrity checked.

Mobile Agent System

Aglets Vl.O

Concordia

D’Agents V2.0

Voyager V3.0

Dartmouth

ObjectSpace

VI. 2.2
Organisation

IBM

Mitsubishi

College
Platform

JDK 1.1

JDK 1.1

Unix

Languages

Java

Java

TCL,

JDK 1.2
Scheme, Java

Java
Standards

-

-

-

CORBA, DCOM

Agent Identity

Yes

UID

Yes

UID

Agent cloning

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Limited Lifetime

No

No

No

Yes

Migration Mechanism

ATP, RMI

SSL, RMI

Sockets, Email

SSL, RMI, HOP

Communication

Messages

MI, RMI

Messages, RPC

Messages

Security Manager

Yes

Yes

-

Yes

Protection of Host

Yes

Policies

Yes

Yes

Protection of Agent

Yes

No

No

No

Agent Tracking

No

No

No

Yes

System Management

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Figure 4.4: Overview of representative Mobile Agent Systems

Concordia
The security model provides:
•

Agent storage protection using encryption,
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•

Agent transmission protection uses digital certificates to verity the used identity and for
encryption symmetric keys,

•

Server resource protection, extends the Java model providing flexible user-based access
control, which uses a Security Passwords Database and a Security Permissions Database.
Security and integrity of Mobile Agents is enforced by the use of Java’s Security
Manager.

Security system protects resources from access by unauthorised mobile agents and protects
mobile agents from being tampered with by unauthorised users.

D ’Agents
D’Agents is a multi-language agent system which focuses on the protection of the host against
malicious agents. Access to system resources is controlled by the Resource Manager, which
has the same role as Java’s Security Manager. TCL-Agents are run on interpreters. The
execution of these agents is based on the notion of trust.
Agents communicate through the network using messages, which can be encrypted or signed.
The signature is used to authenticate the agent to the new host.

Voyager
The security system of Voyager extends Java’s Security System by extending the standard
Security Manager. The distinction between native and foreign objects helps to enforce the
selected security policy.
The protection against unauthorised use can be done by authenticating and verifying
credentials of permissions against Access Control Lists or third party services.
Agent transmission security is guaranteed by the use of the Secure Socket Layer Protocol.
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Authentication

Most of the Mobile Agent Systems have authentication mechanisms implemented. Usually,
this is done using digital certificates which enable the MAS (e.g. Concordia) to verify the
agents owners identity. In some systems (e.g. D’Agents) signatures are used for the same
purposes.
Authentication in the Secure Socket Layer Protocol is also based on digital certificates.

Access Control

Since the most of the MAS are based on Java, access control is enforced by the use of a
security manager (e.g. Aglets Security Manager). In non-Java based systems a similar
component is available (e.g. the Resource Manager in D’Agents).
Additionally Access Control Lists are available.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality can be achieved using encryption. This can be achieved by the use of Public
& Private Key Encryption. Other mechanisms like the SSL Protocol can guarantee
confidentiality.

Integrity

Integrity is guaranteed by the use of hash functions (e.g. IBMs Aglets). Sometime the hash
value of the agent can be signed (D’Agents).

156

Accountability

In most of the MAS Non-repudiation is not available. Only CORBA-compliant MAS with
implemented Security Services will have a rudimentary Non-repudiation mechanism in the
future.
Mobile agent accountability can partially be solved by tracking of mobile agents. Tracking of
mobile agents can show the actual position of our agent. Even non-repudiation can not
provide our agent from “getting lost”. But the message confirming that our agent has arrived
in a certain place will tell us “when“ and

“where” our agent got lost. At least, this

information will allow direct communication to the right place.

Availability

The problems mentioned in section 4.2.3.1 (Java-Implementations-Availability) are also valid
here.

4.2.4.2 Solutions

The following solutions are oriented on the four major protection problems that apply to
MAS:
1. Protecting one agent from another:
•

Agent can make use of secrets to detect tampering, i.e. they can use authentication
based cryptographic methods.

•

Allowing no access to the other agent. This is possible in Java, since it has different
address spaces and access can be controlled using Access Control Lists (ACL’s).
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Additional the use of security policies is possible, which can be enforced by the use of
a Security Manager (Java).
2. Protecting Mobile Agent Systems from Mobile Agents:
It is possible to use certificates to identify the owner of the certificate and of the agent.
3. Protecting Mobile Agent Systems (host) from Mobile Agent Systems (host):
These traditional problems will not be discussed here. For information see [Bru96].
4. Protecting agents from malicious hosts:
This is the result of the fact that every system is only so secure his weakest component
[Pos98]. If in a MAS the host is compromitted than it is almost impossible to protect an
agent. However, there are a few possibilities to endanger the problem:
•

A possibility is to use certificates, before the agent is transferred to another host using
the SSL V.3 protocol. This solution does not protect the agent it only guarantees that
the agent is send to a trusted host. Traditional cryptographic solutions (digital
signatures, certificates) cannot protect the agent, without restricting the execution of
the agent.

•

A solutions of this problem might be the transformation from cleartext programs into
an encrypted form [San97], such that:
the cryptographic encryption is strong and
the encrypted programs can still be executed.

Such a non-classical solution has been provided by Tomas Sanders.

A Non-Classical Approach

It is impossible to hide anything within an agent without the use of cryptography. If part (or
all) of an agent is to be private it has to be protected cryptographically [Che95].
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Agents should be able to sign their orders even in an untrusted environment. The challenge
was if mobile code could carry out cryptographic primitives even though
the agent code is executed inside untrusted computing environment and
-

should run autonomously without interactions with its originating state.

There is no reason why programs have to be executed in clear text form. Computers can
execute cipher-programs without understanding it.
T. Sanders and Chr. Tschudin have made an interesting approach [San98]. They found a
possibility to execute encrypted functions, without being decrypted, without revealing it. This
helps agents to digitally sign their output securely. Unfortunately this applies only to
polynomial and rational functions.
It has to be differentiated between a function and a program. Functions have been
implemented so that their transformation could be implemented as a program. Programs
consist of clear text instruction that a processor / interpreter can understand. The processor
will not be able to understand the „program functions“.
The execution of encrypted functions is based on the protocol for „ non-interactive computing
with encrypted functions“, which has been described by Abadi and Feigenbaum [Aba90], see
figure 4.5.
Problem description:
Alice has an algorithm to compute a function f. Bob has an input x and is willing to compute
f(x) for her, but Alice wants Bob to learn nothing substantial about f. Moreover, Bob should
not need to interact with Alice during the computation of f(x).
We assume that a function f can be encrypted to an other function E(f). P(f) stands for the
program that implements f.
The following protocol has to be enforced:
1. Alice encrypts f
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Figure 4.5: Computing with encrypted Functions [Aba90].
2. Alice creates a program P(E(f)).
3. Alice sends P(E(f)) to Bob.
4. Bob executes P(E(f)) at x.
5. Bob sends P(E(t))(x) to Alice.
6. Alice decrypts P(E(x))(x) and obtains f(x).
If we can execute encrypted programs without decrypting them we automatically have code
privacy and integrity. But still the following attacks are possible: denial of service, random
modification and replay attacks.
Code can be at least partially protected against a malicious host. Polynomials and rational
functions together with encryption schemes can lead to a cryptographical hiding of a function
such that it can nevertheless be executed with a non-interactive protocol.
While traditional methods prohibit the use of secure intelligent mobile agents, this nontraditional methods will support intelligent mobile agents, at least partially.

Future Mobile Agent Systems security solutions should be based on the following two
important ideas:
prevention of security relevant incidents and
security by obscurity - detection imply countermeasures, a function similar to the human
immune system.
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4.2.5 Conclusions

Figure 4.6 gives an overview of the technologies analysed at application level and the security
criteria met. In the last years CORBA has developed. A lot of ORBs have implemented
Security Services. Most of these implementations are error-prone and incomplete. However, it
is foreseeable that complete solutions will be available at the end of the year.
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Figure 4.6: Overview of distributed technologies and security criteria met

Java has also evolved from a language with relative rigid security concept to a language with
a modem, flexible security system (JDK 1.2). Errors and security breaches must be still
expected. But patches which solve the problems will be available in a very short time.
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It cannot be expected that Java solves problems like Non-repudiation, since Java is like the
“glue” between different distributed systems.
Mobile Agent Systems are mainly based on Java. They have mainly the same advantages and
disadvantages as Java. MAS are based on two factors - mobility and autonomy. Most of the
new problems reside in these factors. Security is the key factor which will decide upon the
applicability of this new technology.
All these technologies must be integrated in the future. An approaches in this direction is the
Mobile Agent System I. Facilities (MASIF) defined by the OMG. MASIF defines the
interfaces that are necessary for mobile agents to access CORBA objects.
The use of similar security mechanisms will promote the integration at security system level.
But a distributed system is only as good as the weakest component.
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5. Analysis and Conclusions

Only a view on scenarios integrating distributed technologies will allow us an analysis of the
usability of the implementations and solutions described in chapter 4. In this scenarios the
following different networks will be used.
Usually, applications are distributed in the following three different basic network types:
•

the Internet,

•

the Intranet, and

•

the Extranet.

To determine the differences and the similarities, it is necessary to define them under the
spatial aspect, the technical aspect and the organisational aspects.

5.1 The Internet

The Internet is a global heterogeneous network, which spreads around the whole world. It
connects millions of computers.
From the technical point of view, the Internet is a big network, that uses Internet technology,
like the Internet Protocol(IP) and other IP-based protocols, e.g. the Transport Control Protocol
(TCP), the User Datagram Protocol (UDP),the HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), the File
Transfer Protocol (FTP), and others. The lowest networking level is also characterised by
heterogeneity, i.e. Ethernet, Fast Ethernet, Gigabit Ethernet, Token Ring, ATM.
The Internet is decentralised by design. Each internet computer is independent. Each user can
choose which Internet service to use and to provide to the community. This anarchy is one of
the promoters of the network.
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5.2 The Intranet

The topologic definition of an Intranet consists of all the local networks, which use Internet
Technology (i.e. Protocols based on the Internet Protocol (IP)) and which provide

the

services needed locally.
The technical definition presents the Intranet as a physical and logical separated network,
which uses Internet technology.
From the organisational view of point, the Intranet implements the communication processes
of an enterprise, using Internet technology. Additionally, it has a restricted amount of users.

5.3 The Extranet

From the topologic point of view, the Extranet connects the Intranets of partner enterprises
over the Internet and provides various levels of accessibility to outsiders.
Additionally, the technical part includes the use of Internet technology, which enables every
user to access different parts of the Extranet, depending on his username and password.
The organisational part requires the co-ordination between the involved enterprises.

5.4 The Security Framework

This security framework has been developed to provide a better description of certain
scenarios with a recommendation of security mechanisms to be used. It integrates elements:
•

from the classical security solution presented in section 4.1.1.2,

•

from Checkpoint’s Open Platform for Security and

•

from the presented distributed systems (CORBA, Java and Mobile Agents Systems)
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Figure 5.1: The Security Framework

The most important and spread around scenarios can be represented with the framework
presented in figure 5.1. This framework is split into five parts. A client server system has it’s
client component positioned in entity 1 and his server component positioned in entity 5. The
client and server components can be implemented using one of the three distributed
technologies (CORBA, Java, Mobile Agent Systems).

Application

Entity 1

Entity 2

Type

Client

CORBA

Java

Entity 4

Entity 5

FW-Element

FW-Element

Server

Security

FW-Type

No

Technology

(Protocol)

Entity 3

Security
Technology

Mobile Agent

Figure 5.2: Table representing Recommendations for a certain Scenario
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Further, firewall elements (e.g. TCP-proxy, SOCKS, GlOP-proxy) can be added in entity 2
and entity 4. In entity 3 additional server functionality can be provided. These elements can
be missing.
For a better overview, the security recommendations for a certain scenario are presented
oriented on the entity (client, server, or firewall (fw)-element) and on the distributed
technologies used. For an example see figure 5.2.

5.5 Recommended scenarios

Analysing the networks used by different distributed applications, the following scenarios
have been identified:
•

the Intemet-to-Intemet scenario,

•

the Intranet-to-Intranet scenario,

•

the Intemet-to-Intranet scenario and

•

the Extranet scenario.

Every scenario mentioned above complies to an application type, i.e. for application types
exist:
•

Internet applications mQ 2C^^\\Qdi\\ons vAio's client and server are located in the Internet,

•

Intranet applications are applications who’s client and server are positioned in the same
Intranet,

•

Internet-to-Intranet applications are applications, where the client is located in the
Internet and the server is located in the Intranet, or vice versa,

•

Extranet applications are applications, where the client is located in the Intranet of one
company, while the server is positioned in the Intranet of another company. Both Intranets
are securely connected through the Internet.

166

5.5.1 Internet-to-Internet

The Intemet-to-Intemet scenario does not contain firewall elements or additional servers.
Every workstation hosting client or server components are exposed to attacks from hackers.
However, it is not possible to protect every host in the Internet using a firewall, the costs
would be immense.
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Figure 5.3: Recommendations for an Intemet-to-Intemet Scenario
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CORBA compliant client server systems rely mainly on the security services. Additional
security mechanisms can be implemented using the GSS-API. For transmission security SSL
is recommended, since SECIOP is not able to get through a firewall, or a chain of firewalls
and we don’t know if our connection has to pass a firewall,
Java uses the Java specific security mechanisms.
Mobile Agent Systems are mainly Java based and use the same security mechanisms. But
additional mechanisms can be provided, e.g. agent tracking.
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5.5.2 Intranet-to-Intranet

This scenario also does not contain firewall-elements or additional server components.
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Figure 5.4: Recommendations for an Intranet-to-Intranet Scenario

The structure is mainly the same with the structure of the Intemet-to-Intemet scenario. The
knowledge about the non-existence of firewall-elements in the Intranet allows us to use the
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SECIOP-Protocol. However, a few companies might exist that use firewalls in their Intranet.
No rule without exception.

5.5.3 Internet-to-Intranet
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Figure 5.5: Recommendations for an Intemet-to-Intranet Scenario

The Internet-to-Intranet scenario is one of the most often met scenarios.
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This scenario is oriented at the classical Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) concept presented in
section 4.1.1.2. Therefore two firewall elements are needed that can control HOP connects.
The selected proxy must be able to handle SSL over HOP connects. This has been realised
using GlOP-Proxies (e.g. the Orbix-Proxy-Service in Checkpoint’s Firewall 1). This proxy is
not able to handle SECIOP. So no SECIOP will be used.
The CORE A Security Service should be used at his highest security level.
In Java the usual security mechanisms are used.To protect the server, located in the Intranet,
additionally a scanserver which scans Java applets for malicious activities will be used. The
firewall element, e.g. a generic proxy can delegate the applet security check to the scanserver.
The applet will be transferred to the scanserver using the Content Vectoring Protocol (CVP),
see 4.1.3.2. This Scanserver-concept is part of the Open Platform for Security developed by
Checkpoint and other companies. As a scanserver Fin Jan Surfmgate can be used.
Mobile Agent Systems that have a socket based communication will have a identical solution.
MAS that have a HOP based communication will use the solution for COREA compliant
systems (GlOP-Proxy).

5.5.4 Extranet

Extranets have at least two important aspects:
•

the connection between the firewall elements through the Internet must be secured.

•

It must be checked if a company or an individual has the rights to connect to our Intranet.

A solution might be the definition of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) between these two
Intranets. In this case both firewall elements must be able to handle VPNs. This solution is
transparent for client and server.
For the control at IlOP-level a GIOP Proxy is additionally necessary.
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Figure 5.6: Recommendations for an Extranet Scenario

For Java and Mobile Agent Systems the VPN based solution is transparent too.
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5.6 Analysis

The result of this analysis should allow the evaluation of different scenarios. It mainly should
allow us to find the weakest entity in scenarios which fits the framework defined in chapter 4.
Since we consider here only Mobile Agents which have been implemented in Java, they can
be considered to be a special case of the Java applications and will not be evaluated
separately.
The basic technologies used are:
• Java based technologies,
• Communication technologies and
• CORBA based technologies.
Regarding factor weighting we consider the following two basic situations, if 100 % is
theoretically optimal security:
• with CORBA
40 % Java (including Mobile Agents)
40 % Communication
20 % CORBA
• without CORBA
50 % Java (including Mobile Agents)
50 % Communication
These above mentioned values are the result of the evaluation of the different security
mechanisms implemented in different distribution technologies.

The different security mechanisms based on different technologies can be weighted as
follows. However only the combinations that make sense will be considered:
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Basic technology

Weighting Factors
Combination of
security mechanisms With CORBA
Without CORBA

Java / any language a) Security Manager
providing security
+ Encryption +
mechanisms
X.509
(Special case Mobile b) Sec. Man. +
Agents)
Encryption

40%

50%

28%

35%

c) Encryption +
X.509
d) Sec. Man. + X.509
e) Sec. Man.
f) Encryption
g) X.509

28%

35%

20%
8%
4%
2%

25%
10%
5%
2,5 %

Communication

h) SSL over HOP
i) SSL
k) SECIOP

40%
24%
20%

50%
30%
25 %

CORBA

1) CORBAsec

20%

—

Firewall elements

m) VPN + SocksProxy
n) VPN + GIOPProxy
o) GlOP-Proxy
p) VPN
q) Socks-Proxy
r) TCP-Proxy

100%

100%

90%

90%

80%
75%
70%
40%

80%
75%
70%
40%

Figure 5.7: A try to weighting the different combination of security mechanisms used

The weight factors from figure 5.7 are normalised within the 100 % optimal security, not
exceeding the maximum values for the specific technology, e.g. for the case with CORBA not
more than 40 % for Java.
The values from figure 5.7 are based on experience. This is only the first approach of this
problem. To check the applicability, this method has to be applied on bigger systems, has to
be checked and has to be re-evaluated later.
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Figure 5.8: Pattern-check to find the weakest entity in the four scenarios previously defined
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This check is not part of this master thesis. For this check the following table type should be
used (figure 5.8).
Figure 5.8 includes all possible solutions that make sense from our point of view and will be
filled out by the people evaluating their systems.
Under certain circumstances the evaluation scheme makes no sense for the first two cases
(Internet-to-Intemet and Intranet) because the evaluation of the client and server can be
symmetrical (the same).
However, it is possible to have a different evaluation result if we use different
implementations of the security mechanisms, e.g. different Security Manager in Java, which
provide different security levels.
Comparing the values in one chain, which corresponds to the values of the evaluated entities,
the minimal value will indicate the weakest entity.

Scenario

Internet-toIntranet Sc.

Sum

Additional
Server
Entity no. 3
b = 25 %

Firewall
Element
Entity no. 4
0 = 80 %

Server

Entitj' no. 1
b- 20 %

Firewall
Element
Entity no. 2
q = 55 %

h = 40 %

"

h = 40 %

—

h = 40 %

Client

1 = 0%
60%

—

55%

1 = 20 %
85%

—

80%

Entity no. 5
b = 28 %

1 = 20 %
88%

Figure 5.9: Example of an analysis of a certain situation (here Intemet-to-Intranet scenario)

The above table gives an example of finding the weakest element. As described above the
security manager (b) is present in different implementation, having different qualities. The
client implementation of the security manager has the worst quality, while the server
implementation of the security manager has the best possible quality, see figure 5.7.
The encryption facilities used (h) are the same on all used entities.
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The client does not use the CORBA Security Services (1). The CORBA Security Services (1)
are used only on the additional server and the server positioned in the Intranet (entity no. 5).
The firewall element positioned in the entity no. 2 does not provide control at HOP command
level.
Summing up the values in every entity the resulting value is an indicator of the security level
provided by the client. This identifier allows to compare different basic security technologies.
In the example above it can be concluded that the first firewall element is the weakest entity
in the chain, because the sum has the lowest value. This can be improved by using a GIOPproxy.

5.7 Conclusions

As we have seen in the sections above for all usual scenarios there are solutions possible. This
is the result of the integration of different security mechanisms as the CORBA’s Security
Services, the Secure Socket Layer, the different firewall technologies and a part of the Open
Platform for Security (OPSEC).
These solutions guarantee a high level of security at application level. However, this is only a
view from the upper layers. On the lower level additional security mechanisms can be
implemented.

6 Outlook & Future Research

As we have seen in the last chapter integration of security mechanisms can solve and generate
a lot of problems.
The following problems must be solved and are subject to future research:
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•

The SECIOP Protocol limits the usability with firewalls. At the moment it is impossible to
control the flow of a SECIOP connect through a firewall.

•

Further integration of the Open Platform for Security.

•

Implementation and integration of the ISO Non-repudiation model in CORBA.

•

What effect will the changes, defined in CORBA 3.0, have ?
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A2.

Java Policy

The system security file ( $JAVAHOME/lib/security/java.security ) is a set of properties that
apply to the security package. By default, the policy for a Java program is controlled by the
system security file and is read from the following two locations:
Policy, url. 1 =flle:${java. home}/lib/security/java.policy
Policy. url.2=file:${user. home}/.java, policy
These policies will be read in the order of the numbers attached. While the first policy
complies to every user, the second one is used dependant. The set of rule consisting of the
sum of both files is the final policy.
The syntax of a policy entry is as follows:
Grant [ signedBy <signer> ] [, CodeBase <code source>J {
permission <class> [ <name> [, <action list>]];

permission <class> [ <name> [, <action list>]];
);

In the above syntax the signer and the code source are arbitrary. The grant entry consists of a
list defining the permissions, the targets and the attached action, see an example below:
grant {

permissionjava.util.PropertyPermission “java.vm.name”, ’’read”;
}:
The above entry allows the java.util.PropertyPermission class to read the name of the Java
virtual machine (java.vm.name).
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The Java policy file:
// Standard extensions get all permissions by default
grant CodeBase "file:${java.home}/lib/ext/-" {
permission java.security.AllPermission;
};

// default permissions granted to all domains
grant {
// Allows any thread to stop itself using the java.lang.Thread.stopQ
// method that takes no argument.
// Note that this permission is granted by default only to remain
// backwards compatible.
// It is strongly recommended that you either remove this permission
// from this policy file or further restrict it to code sources
// that you specify, because Thread.stop() is potentially unsafe.
// See "http://java.sun.com/notes" for more information,
permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "stopThread";

// allows anyone to listen on un-privileged ports
permission java.net.SocketPermission "localhost: 1024-", "listen";

// "standard" properies that can be read by anyone
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.version", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.vendor", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.vendor.url", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.class.version", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "os.name", "read";
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permission java.util.PropertyPermission "os.version", "read";
permission java.util.Property Permission "os.arch", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "file.separator", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "path.separator", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "line.separator", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.specification.version", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.specification.vendor", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.specification.name", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.vm.speciflcation.version", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.vm.specification.vendor", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.vm.specification.name", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.vm.version", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.vm.vendor", "read";
permission java.util.PropertyPermission "java.vm.name", "read";
};

Access to any arbitrary resource must require explicit permission. Default policies are pooled
under the codebase ALL [Mid99].

193

A3

Evaluation of ORB Security Mechanisms

Evaluated ORBs
Software Versions

Orbix Verision 2.02*°

Year of evaluation

1998

Security Services

Additional

available

Information

No Security Services

No Naming service

(CSS)
OrbixOTM l.Oc^

1998

SSL Package included Bug, not working

Visibroker Ver.3.4

1998

No Security services

Visibroker SSL Pack

2000

SSL

Patch necessary

Orbacus for Java

2000

CSS and SSL

Bug, not working

Orbacus for C++

2000

CSS

Kerberos encryption
libraries missing, due
to export control.

A4.

Client Server Implementation with SSL

The below described applications work over HOP or HOP over SSL. It had been set up to be
used as test application for the communicates through firewalls.
This example is based on an example developed by Inprise and allows the opening of a bank
account and queries of the balance through a simple interface. This implementation uses

Due to the stop of support newer versions were not available.
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interceptors, which will not be explained here, since it is irrelevant for the goal of this thesis.
Details about interceptors can be found in 4.1.2.4.
The following implementations use the following software packages: Visibroker 3.4.
SSLpackage 3.3 and the Vbssl 3.4 Patch. Without this patch the SSLpackage is not working
properly. Since the Visibroker SSL Package uses local classes only application can be used.
Applet are not working.
Before running the client and server, it is important to start the Visibroker Smart Agent or the
Osagent.exe, which performs the registration of the server object. The Server has to be started
first, since the Visibroker is not able to start a registered server. The server has to run all the
time. (ORBIX' * is able to activate a registered server object at client request. Further it is able
to finish an server object threat if it has not been used a certain amount of time. ORBIX has
not been used here because the Orbix Version 2 was not working with the OTM Package
(version 1.0c), which contains the SSL implementation.)
After starting the server, the client can be started.
In figure A4.1 you can find an overview of the tested Client - Server communication with
SSL.
Client / Server

C++ - Server

Java - Server

C++ - Client

Working

Working

Java - Client

Working

Working

Figure A4.1 Overview - Client Server SSL Implementation Test

The following certificates have been used in this example:
Testcert.b64 - demo certificate
Cacert.b64 - CA certificate

195

Key.b64 contains the private key.

Source code
BankJDL

// Defines the IDL-Interface for the Bank object,
module Bank {
interface Account {
float balanceO;
};

interface AccountManager {
Account open(in string name);
};

Accountimpl.java

// Contains the Account Object implementation, see IDL definition
public class Accountlmpl extends Bank._AccountImplBase {
public AccountImpl(float balance) {
_balance = balance;

}
public float balanceO {
return _balance;
}

11

ORBIX is the object request broker manufactured by IONA Technologies Ireland.
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private float _balance;

AccountManagerImpl.java

// Contains the account manager implementation, see Bank.idl
import java.util.*;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.ssl.*;
import org.omg.CORBA.ORBPackage.*;

public class AccountManagerlmpl extends Bank. AccountManagerlmplBase {
public AccountManagerImpl(String name) {
super(name);

}
public synchronized Bank.Account open(String name) {
Current current = null;
// get a reference to the ssl current and use it to retrieve
// the distinguished name from the client certificate,
try {
// Get the SSL Current, if it is not available
// an InvalidName Exception will be thrown,
current = CurrentHelper.narrow(
_orb( ).resolve_initial_references("SSLCurrent"));

}
catch(InvalidName e) {
System.err.println("\nAn SSL Current was not found.");

}
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try {
X509CertificateChain certificateChain
= current. getPeerCertificateChain(thi s);
// if available, use the distinguished name instead of the
// name passed in from the client,
name = "Distinguished Name: "
+ certificateChain.distinguishedName();
}

catch(org.omg.CORBA.BAD_OPERATION e) {
// If the operation on the current has thrown this exception
// then the target object, in this case 'this', was not initialized with SSL.
System.err.println("\nAn SSL Connection is not available.");
}

catch(Exception e) {
// If the getPeerCertificateChain() returns an exception
// other then org.omg.CORBA.BAD_OPERATION, assume that the
// peer did not offer a certificate.
System.out.println("\nThe peer did not offer a certificate.");
}

// Lookup the account in the account dictionary.
Bank.Account account = (Bank.Account) _accounts.get(name);
// If there was no account in the dictionary, create one.
if(account == null) {
// Make up the account's balance, between 0 and 1000 dollars,
float balance = Math.abs(_random.nextInt()) % 100000 / lOOf;
// Create the account implementation, given the balance.
198

account = new Accountlmpl(balance);
// Make the object available to the ORB.
_boa( ).obj_is_ready(account);
// Print out the new account.
S y stem. out. println(;
System.out.println("Created account: " + account + " for " + name);
// Save the account in the account dictionary.
_accounts.put(name, account);

}
// Return the account,
return account;

}
private Dictionary _accounts = new Hashtable();
private Random _random = new Random();
}

Server.] ava

// Bank Server implementation
import com.visigenic.vbroker.ssl.*;
public class Server {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
// Initialize the ORB.
org.omg.CORBA.ORB orb = org.omg.CORBA.ORB.init(args,null);
// Initialize the BOA.
org.omg.CORBA.BOA boa = ((com.visigenic.vbroker.orb.ORB)orb).BOA_init();
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// Create the account manager object.
Bank.AccountManager manager = new AccountManagerImpl("SSLBankManager");
// Export the newly create object.
boa.obj_is_ready(manager);
System.out.println(manager + " is ready.");
// Wait for incoming requests
boa.impl_is_ready();

}

Init.java // Server

// Initialiser obtains a reference to the Certificate Manager
// adds the certificates and keys
// requests the clients certificate
package SSLServerInter;
import java.util.*;
import org.omg.CORBA.*;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.ssl.*;
import org.omg.CORBA.ORBPackage.*;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.interceptor.ChainServerInterceptorFactory;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.interceptor.ChainServerInterceptorFactoryHelper;
public class Init extends com.visigenic.vbroker.orb.Servicelnit {
final private static String testCert_base64 =
"-—BEGIN CERTIFICATE-—\n"+
"MIICpTCCAg4CAQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgbkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAIVTMRMwEQYD\n"+
"VQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRIwEAYDVQQHEwITYW4gTWF0ZW8xHDAaBgNVBAoTE0Iu\n"+
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"cHJpc2UgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24xFDASBgNVBAsTC0VuZ21uZWVyaW5nMSQwIgYDVQQD\n"+
"ExtJbnByaXNlIENvcnBvcmF0aW9uIERlbW8gQ0ExJzAlBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGHNl\n"+
"cHBvcnRAY29ycC5pbnByaXNlLmNvbTAeFw050DAlMDIwMDM2MDlaFw050TExMDMw\n"+
"MDM2MDlaMHwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRIwEAYD\n"+
"VQQHEwlTYW4gTWF0ZW8xHjAcBgNVBAoUFUJvcmxhbmQgSW50ZXJuYXRpb25hbDEU\n"+
"MBIGAlUECxQLRW5naW51ZXJpbmcxDjAMBgNVBAMUBUJlY2t5MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3\n"+
"DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgOCgGZHY914m+GK/el2eTPnkMl/PswyP12k+uoqXKLOf\n"+
" AlOOvd 1 FuPYasOiUGNiJSC YwOkso 1 eNRTtsGCF[N42 Y01d9IXAf62XNv97d9VM40t\n"+
"ggJo7pDVE6DmbySSWo+HKu2HLRNU+g0VJ652AAR3Uafd4eLn6eK95DGWYEVCXRLAn"+
"oQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBAUAA4GBAEPR9m/axfbE8apeLcGWq3kXFehLNhfJ\n"+
"vVF7jO+1 Ad8zLF5Nl YOngy8 AGkLhf/waHJxFLKbjE 1 q/RA0sTRa5Nz80pJhvV3tq\n"+
"AUu4PayfWdPjk7wH5F5avcOrbzl7jorklBRIddobbwGsHujOBNL+4A6FxDZCD9uV\n"+
"TFnnN57HpZPS\n"+
—END CERTIFICATE-—\n";

final private static String caCert_base64 =
—BEGIN CERTIFICATE

\n"+

"MIIC+jCCAmOgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9wOBAQQFADCBuTELMAkGAlUEBhMCVVMx\n"+
"EzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExEjAQBgNVBAcTCVNhbiBNYXRlbzEcMBoGAlUE\n"+
"ChMTSW5wcmlzZSBDb3Jwb3JhdGlvbjEUMBIGAlUECxMLRW5naW51ZXJpbmcxJDAi\n"+
"BgNVBAMTG01ucHJpc2UgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24gRGVtbyBDQTEnMCUGCSqGSIb3DQEJ\n"+
"ARYYc3VwcG9ydEBjb3JwLmlucHJpc2UuY29tMB4XDTk4MDUwMTIzMzAyNloXDTA4\n"+
"MDQyODIzMzAyNlowgbkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlh\n"+
"MRIwEAYDVQQHEwlTYW4gTWF0ZW8xHDAaBgNVBAoTE0lucHJpc2UgQ29ycG9yYXRp\n"+
"b24xFDASBgNVBAsTC0VuZ21uZWVyaW5nMSQwIgYDVQQDExtJbnByaXNlIENvcnBv\n"+
"cmF0aW9uIERlbW8gQ0ExJzAlBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGHNlcHBvcnRAY29ycC5pbnBy\n"+
"aXNlLmNvbTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9wOBAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEA2Lad3mmXsH2Dfb8\n"+
"+DvWF8N3CvpMrZixqFKjSSJJsPL3FbALGPFHvAsFDe6JNz+dDU15ZaVhg95cNwdV\n"+
"aeFzY 1 iL3yPjg7hxyCGvbMJKapeOSuJKxaqy6bKBpOeI Y091 lo8 WU6/YNa/rqIIW\n"+
"sTDdspuFSCN4+Z8Uu5VVnIvLnb8CAwEAAaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkq\n"+
"hkiG9wOBAQQFAAOBgQBdE7Zr5TTriICBfRNmFZMCkKD5KOBgDnmBzYTeWHuYdJPV\n"+
"d2izFF6W8BFL3eOJzTK4QYQCNSnxNqPxdmDAJFlaCBQRc5HjRFi7/XyWaUW/byZJ\n"+
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"QSRiqaNpaWlyaItuV2GzMqf3RTFbfE9oxDM27EUWzkTkwVGUAulEZrimnxv58Q==\n"+
—end CER riFlCAlE—-\n";

final private static String encryptedPrivateKey_base64 =
"-—BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY...... \n"+
"MIICmDAaBgkqhkiG9w0BBQMwDQQIucbn+/VNqXsCAQUEggJ4OZ/KqwCzKjiHPnBr\n"+
"I0q7cWr/f+P2944vWCs/jFdYfWSX8zy+RZQY8BpaR6yUFZfIvicmGjjnwyKYEDVJ\n"+
"KNjqPp/cO+wzFEyZ2815C9frCWy/9u3hkbzrfwThkYKiIZ5X8v/G7DSs+Mexn9dg\n"+
"ECZVRjmzhsKWbogYSC2sKBU6wewHWWGu5zidBU2jt+70GUjrGINR9AUjwLoHRIxD\n"+
"WDxDNu0c+S0nGP+QqTP/u++/v5eiv94WU++xg60BnZOoHBLaDE+UCwz/LIU9iny9\n"+
"OWEw7fsxavXvRfVlHIa6zPZJMY66AGqKOQKqnmAlab8mMf2fwKjBBE6bYWajKbgA\n"+
"wJELiJ60G6ojQHjRnDzhljnukMi0vYVjes3ZnX72f98FoDWoxk92vMWR0rcANhDz\n"+
"jBMlNzjJGGucDafy2xyU8a9uhWN+YZSp8Qq9SIEC90LeADWs/9J6GSmUxTnNvGIAn"+
"Hqa0XWRAe8brKadVBXjl246asfSwDjrm4DDUeAeKW56Tx7pF4PPsNkanxL35KDCF\n"+
"cJQrs2XrvINOo6i7Rw70QuO/aMvIlyArqYsdwPSTiBnZTNjEbjBALovezw6He4Gm\n"+
"25TjlLRxsEb67qBML0o5McsXe758bnJp9wK9PATX0Tp7BYSWrxinZuHRinhmrUFP\n’*+
"tYfpXd3 lLoil8gILxboWvEiqQoLH824h2j I MlhfitQvh4PKaDwsD 1 cdMainOkpi75\n"+
"GfzTYMK3HnJvRYdZsRerpjcF3Kb591j5vuhbqNLlaHsU0mzpECvd0QDooODiWC04\n"+
''t+lv8PiV7k2p3IzIzbj8IDSiyCHgorvnOZVZg33KA3VREGok7hI3vSSbsAU-\ji"+
—END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY...... \n";

public void init(ORB orb, Properties props) {
com.visigenic.vbroker.orb.ORB _orb = (com.visigenic.vbroker.orb.ORB)orb;
CertificateManager manager = null;
try {
org.omg.CORBA.Object obj
= orb.resolve_initial_references("ChainServerInterceptorFactory");
ChainServerInterceptorFactory fact
= ChainServerInterceptorFactory Helper.narrow(obj);
fact.add(new SSLServerInterFactory(_orb));
}
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catch(InvalidName e) {
System.eiT.println(
"/nChainServerInterceptorFactory could not be found: ");

}
// Get the certificate manager from the initial references,
try {
manager = CertificateManagerHelper.narrow(
orb.resolve_initial_references("SSLCertificateManager"));
}

catch(lnvalidName e) {
System.err.println("/nSSLCertificateManager could not be found.");
}

// Set my certificate chain, ordered from user to CA.
byte[] testCert = testCert_base64.getBytes();
byte[] caCert = caCert_base64.getBytes();
byte[][] certificates = {testCert, caCert};
manager.setCertificateChain(certificates);
// Set the private key.
byte[] encryptedPrivateKey = encryptedPrivateKey_base64.getBytes();
manager.setEncryptedPrivateKey(encryptedPrivateKey, "@borland");
manager.requestClientCertificate();
}

Client.java
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// Bank Client
// binds to the Account Manager
public class Client {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
// Initialize the ORB.
org.omg.CORBA.ORB orb = org.omg.CORBA.ORB.init(args, null);
// Locate an account manager.
Bank.AccountManager manager =
Bank.AccountManagerHelper.bind(orb, "SSLBankManager");
// use args[0] as the account name, or a default.
String name = args.length > 0 ? args[0] : "Jack B. Quick";
// Request the account manager to open a named account.
Bank.Account account = manager.open(name);
// Get the balance of the account,
float balance = account.balance();
// Print out the balance.
System.out.println("The balance in " + name + "'s account is $" + balance);

}

Init.java // Client

// Initialiser obtains a reference to the certificate manager
// adds the clients certificates
// adds the clients key
package SSLClientInter;
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import java.util.*;
import org.omg.CORBA.*;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.ssl.*;
import org.omg.CORBA.ORBPackage.*;
public class Init extends com.visigenic.vbroker.orb.Servicelnit {
final private static String testCert_base64 =
"-—BEGIN CERTIFICATE-—\n"+
"MIICpzCCAhACAQIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwgbkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAIVTMRMwEQYD\n"+
"VQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmIhMRIwEAYDVQQHEwITYW4gTWF0ZW8xHDAaBgNVBAoTE0Iu\n"+
"cHJpc2UgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24xFDASBgNVBAsTC0VuZ21uZWVyaW5nMSQwIgYDVQQD\n"+
"ExtJbnByaXNIIENvcnBvcmF0aW9uIERIbW8gQ0ExJzAIBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGHNl\n"-i"cHBvcnRAY29ycC5pbnByaXNILmNvbTAeFw050DAIMDIwMDM2MzNaFw050TExMDMw\n"+
"MDM2MzNaMH4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAIVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmIhMRIwEAYD\n"+
"VQQHEwITYW4gTWF0ZW8xHjAcBgNVBAoUFUJvcmxhbniQgSW50ZXJuYXRpb25hbDEU\n"+
"MBIGAIUECxQLRW5naW51ZXJpbmcxEDAOBgNVBAMUBOJIbGIvbnQwgZ8wDQYJKoZI\n"+
"hvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAMV7E+3FGiyeaP53pyUIJp2XjwmQsCECW+Cc4SWs\n"+
"tNeD2hH+Wqmw4y8dXV7OInm72IwBoThU3R3LGPsUHYvAXhCZseA+/n0UxD/ZrKca\n"+
"zTWWCvDDKRvRD+GTT+JRgBk/k/rGk7dpD+6OqBZhKim0NnO7ecK6/qwFo238tYIH\n"+
"9A7dAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQADgYEAfNnVwDk/wIJ6YBEaMVxrJcGasIIV\n"+
"P3Y0e7bi+gdE52GG2niNCwTBEDPvdRuLMXYhuIIrpPqMDC6W4eABCXvA8B9WRIaCK\n"+
"RqMfYVsJNkoEFI2ZQ989JecFFpJBVYmeF3PaMWyBxYEdHxdnIdIAzdB85/GnFkZU\n"+
"YoeZW7IX5mtmHhs=\n"+
"-—END CERTIFICATE-—\n";

final private static String caCert_base64 =
-begin CERTIFICATE-—\n"+
"MIIC+jCCAmOgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9wOBAQQFADCBuTELMAkGAlUEBhMCVVMx\n"+
"EzARBgNVBAgTCkNhbGImb3JuaWExEjAQBgNVBAcTCVNhbiBNYXRIbzEcMBoGAIUE\n"+
"ChMTSW5wcmlzZSBDb3Jwb3JhdGIvbjEUMBIGAIUECxMLRW5naW5IZXJpbmcxJDAi\n"+
"BgNVBAMTG0IucHJpc2UgQ29ycG9yYXRpb24gRGVtbyBDQTEnMCUGCSqGSIb3DQEJ\n"+
"ARYYc3VwcG9ydEBjb3JwLmIucHJpc2UuY29tMB4XDTk4MDUwMTIzMzAyNIoXDTA4\n"+
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"MDQyODIzMzAyNIowgbkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlh\n"+
"MRIwEAYDVQQHEwlTYW4gTWF0ZW8xHDAaBgNVBAorE01ucHJpc2UgQ29ycG9yYXRp\n"+
"b24xFDASBgNVBAsTC0VuZ21uZWVyaW5nMSQwIgYDVQQDExtJbnByaXNlIENvcnBv\n"+
"cmF0aW9uIERlbW8gQ0ExJzAlBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGHNlcHBvcnRAY29ycC5pbnBy\n"+
"aXNlLmNvbTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9wOBAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEA2Lad3mmXsH2Dfb8\n"+
"+DvWF8N3CvpMrZixqFKjSSJJsPL3FbALGPFHvAsFDe6JNz+dDU15ZaVhg95cNwd\Aji"+
"aeFzY 1 iL3yPjg7hxyCGvbMJKapeOSuJKxaqy6bKBpOeI Y091 lo8WU6/YNa/rqIlW\n"+
"sTDdspuFSCN4+Z8Uu5VVnIvLnb8CAwEAAaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkq\n"+
"hkiG9wOBAQQFAAOBgQBdE7Zr5TTriICBfRNmFZMCkKD5KOBgDnmBzYTeWHuYdJPV\n"+
"d2izFF6W8BFL3e0JzTK4QYQCNSnxNqPxdmD/UFlaCBQRc5HjRFi7/XyWaUW/byZJ\n"+
"QSRiqaNpaWlyaltuV2GzMqf3RTFbfE9oxDM27EUWzkTkwVGUAulFZrimnxv58Q==\n"+
"-—END CERTIFICATE-—\n";

final private static String encryptedPrivateKey_base64 =
"..—begin

encrypted private key-—\n"+

"MIICmDAaBgkqhkiG9w0BBQMwDQQIwJTbGr2UGvwCAQUEggJ4nIzLL75OR+/JD2Ww\n"+
"MJHHLfADqxblrJfRKWyIgSNHrPgQokkFnWLFxL04IPxFD10vIkUWqYDmdSTIE6uZ\n"+
"KTLhJLTgb3Iq7gxa4IvTBtVeEYbOwZXsZByee38GI5\vlfL3V/k33/AANESS+hOkm\n"+
"kIemGlc5Fft)REZs4Hd7WkFSWPRIgJDjIXOLL/sdOIfBkSBztApzs8Y7U9u/ueNhI\n"+
"FGvpmZE5RS32T2vgns8Q2oqFU7uL+xUDQoYXbBgAlrHCUj9DO+eYBIwcdOcxsqqG\n"+
"xoV V/mAhD+I I MSaEZ81 hWV I EE2FlR40JcxfWtPwJ I DNs/ItOLC/RMdypMtYsD I xG\n"+
"BzwtHkzijeE32N8HgkhgTOaJxUyD4ql3ZFubx/eoD9ecb39cPDo/56xDj7Hkycnk\n"+
"zybAn++eTYVLqp2Iw6m8v8tTsTRkXakEQ3TXOiHYWdjsA^TIFHCObzOiYu5YI4fb\n"+
"LNDrvRxT3hXLSO4EaIaWZXLOn0XQmS/y2yCuaynTUcUKdIxEqYHuiN8txUQP2rZl\n"+
"AkLT4QANNcIVYZqbBgbf9kJBgq6BTkFQIb3wnV2FZgDqw0Vz9qpB3S6DaDos/AuL\n"+
"Z9PRtpznMNPbTIEX5PiRDkGnbEbr2eiNgWOXsXUYMkGbgLV665eoKAv3qwtjqvpA\n"+
"cbEYoeSZY5COonVOH7XrwwlmGk5gLU2BJf8gfSi5C3D86VnLSCsGgmLuvOT2p+jz\n"+
"PqNbyXOSPL WPdSD64FrZPNPW6yDA82ZLpqIKkfFUd6Rqtt I tYSsJ 1B7 W4oL3upcz\n"+
"oaz6L+kHkwUrKGPqaVM/97RONSLrmuw05kMVIJp+ObiOFiKCWyuGdABdQnO=\n"+
".—end encrypted private key—\n";

public void init(ORB orb, Properties props) {
CertificateManager manager = null;
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// Get the certificate manager from the initial references,
try {
manager = CertificateManagerHelper.narrow(
orb.resolve_initial_references("SSLCertificateManager"));

}
catch(InvalidName e) {
System.err.println("SSLCertificateManager could not be found: " + e);
System.exit(-l);

}
// Set the certificate chain. Order: user,..., CA
byte[][] certificates = {
testCert_base64.getBytes(),
caCert_base64.getBytes()
};

manager.setCertificateChain(certificates);
// Set the private key.
byte[] encryptedPrivateKey = encryptedPrivateKey_base64.getBytes();
manager.setEncryptedPrivateKey(encryptedPrivateKey, "@borland");

}

Interceptor code

SSLServerInter.j ava

// intercepts all incoming requests
// prints out the target, the operation name, the SSL version, the cipher suite, and the client
207

// certificate
package SSLServerInter;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.interceptor.*;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.IOP.*;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.GIOP.*;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.ssl.*;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.interceptor.ServerInterceptorPackage.*;
import org.omg.CORBA.ObjectHolder;
import org.omg.CORBA.portable.*;
import org.omg.CORBA.ORBPackage.*;
public class SSLServerInter extends DefaultServerlnterceptor {
private Current current;
private com.visigenic.vbroker.orb.ORB orb;
public SSLServerInter(com.visigenic.vbroker.orb.ORB orb) {
// Initialize the ORB.
_orb = orb;
// Get the SSL Current, if it is not available
// an InvalidName Exception will be thrown,
try {
current = CurrentHelper.narrow(
_orb .reso 1 ve_initial_references(" S S L Current"));

}
catch(InvalidName e) {
System.err.println("\nAn SSL Current was not found.");
}

I
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// For each request sent to a server.... print out the client's credentials.
public InputStream receive_request(RequestHeader hdr, ObjectHolder target,
InputStream buf, Closure closure) {
System.out.println("\nIntercepted Request!" +
"\nTarget -—> " + target.value +
"\nOperation Name —> " + hdr.operation +
"\n\nSSL Info:");
try {
System.out.println("Negotiated Cipher: " +
CipherSuite.toString(current.getNegotiatedCipher(target.value)));
System.out.println(" Protocol Version: " +
current.getProtocolVersion(target.value));
try {
System.out.println("Peer's certificate: " +
current.getPeerCertificateChain(target. value));

}
catch(Exception e) {
// If the getPeerCertificateChain() returns an exception
// other then org.omg.CORBA.BAD OPERATION, assume that the
// peer did not offer a certificate.
System.err.println("\nThe peer did not offer a certificate.");

}
}
catch(org.omg.CORBA.BAD_OPERAT10N e) {
// If the operation on the current has thrown this exception
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// then the target object, in this case 'manager', was not initialized with SSL.
System.err.println("\nAn SSL Connection is not available.");

}
return null;

SSLServerInterFactory.java

// creates an instance of the server interceptor
package SSLServerInter;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.interceptor.*;
import com.visigenic.vbroker.IOP.*;

public class SSLServerInterFactory implements ServerInterceptorFactory {
private com.visigenic.vbroker.orb.ORB _orb;
public SSLServerInterFactory(com.visigenic.vbroker.orb.ORB orb) {
_orb = orb;

}
public Serverinterceptor create(TaggedProfile prof) {
System.out.println("\nFactory -> installing ssl enabled interceptor.");
return new SSLServerInter{_orb);

}
}
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Running the Test Application with Client and Ser\ er implemented in Java.

First the VisiBroker SmartAgent must be started. After that, the Java Server mustbe started
with the following command:
vbj -DORBservices=com.visigenic.vbroker.ssl,SSLServerInter -DOAid=SSLTPool Serve

d: \Programme\J B uilder3\bin\vbj. exe

Factory ->

installing ssl enabled interceptor.

a

Intercepted Request?
Target------- > AccounthanagerIiipl[Seruer,oid=Persistent Id[repId=IDL:Bank/flccountMa
nager :1.0,objectNaiT)e=SSLBankManager ] ]
Operation Name ----- > open
SSL Info:
Negotiated Cipher:
RSfl_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
Protocol Uersion:
Uersion_30
Peer's cert if icate : X509Certif icate [siibjects = [flUfl [oid=C, leuel=0, tag=19,data='’US'’
], AUA [oid=ST, leuel=l,tag=19,data=’'Calif ornia”], ftUA [oid=L, leuel=2,tag=19,data=''
San Mateo"], AUAtoid=0,leuel=3,tag=20,data="Borland International"], AUA[oid=OU,
leoel=4, tag=20,data="Engineering"], AUA [oid=CN, leuel=5, tag=20,data="Belinont"] ],e
xtensions=[],parent=X509Certificate[subjects=[AUA[oid=C,leyel=0,tag=19,data="US"
], AUA[oid=ST,leyel=l,tag=19,data="California"], AUA[oid=L,leuel=2,tag=19,data=" m
San Mateo"], AUA[oid=0,leuel=3,tag=19,data="Inprise Corporation"], AUA[oid=OU,le
uel=4,tag=19,data="Engineering"], AUA[oid=CN,leyel=5,tag=19,data="Inprise Corpor
at ion Deno CA"], AUA [oid=eiTiailAddress, leoel=6,tag=22,data="siipportPcorp. inprise .
con"]],extensions=[Extension[oid=noMatch,critical=0,data=""]],parent=null]]
Created account: AccountInpl[Server,oid=TransientId[repId=IDL:Bank/Account:1.0,s
erMerId=2,creationTine=-l459351191]] for Distinguished Name: C=US, ST=California
, L=San Mateo, 0=Borland International, OU=Engineering, CN=Belmont
Intercepted Request?
Target ------- > AccountInpl[Server,oid=TransientId[repId=IDL:Bank/Account:1.0,serue
rId=2,creationTine =-1459351191]]
Operation Name ----- > balance
SSL Info:
Negotiated Cipher: RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
Protocol Uersion:
Uersion_30
Peer's certificate: X509Certificate[subjects=[AUA[oid=C,level=0,tag=19,data="US"
], AUA[oid=ST,leve1=1,tag=19,data="California"], AUA[oid=L,leyel=2,tag=19,data="
San Mateo"], AUA[oid=0,level=3,tag=20,data="Borland International"], AUA[oid=OU,
level=4,tag=20,data="Engineering"], AUA[oid=CN,level=5,tag=20,data="Belnont"]],e
xtensions=[],parent=X509Certificate[subJects=[AUA[oid=C,level=0,tag=19,data="US"
], AUA[oid=ST,leyel=l,tag=19,data="California"], AUA[oid=L,leoel=2,tag=19,data="
San Mateo"], AUA[oid=0,leuel=3,tag=19,data="Inprise Corporation"], AUA[oid=OU,le
uel=4,tag=19,data="Engineering"], AUA[oid=CN,leuel=5,tag=19,data="Inprise Corpor
ation Deno CA"], AUA[oid=enailAddress,leoel=6,tag=22,data="support0corp.inprise.
con"]],extensions=[Extension[oid=noMatch,critical=0,data=""]],parent=null]]
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Figure A4.2: The Java Server Start Trace

The parameters used, define the use of the interceptors and the reuse of threads (garbage
collection).
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A trace containing the start of the server and the reply to a clients request, can be found
below:
AccountManagerImpl[Server,oid=PersistentId[repId=IDL:Bank/AccountManager:1.0,
objectName=SSLBankManager]] is ready.

For detailed information about SSL, including the negotiated chiper, the used SSL protocol
version and the used certificates, which are printed out, see figure A4.2. After that, the Java
client can be started with the following line:
vbj -DORBservices=com.visigenic.vbroker.ssl,SSLClientInter Client

It will get the following reply from the server:

C:\WINNT\Sys(em32\CMD.exe
The balance in Jack B. Quick's account is $241.55
Taste driicken, un fortzusetzen ...

rT5nn

Lj
Figure A4.3: Client Output, after a Request

The traces (protocols) of the execution of the following client-server systems: Java Client C++ Server, C++ Client - Java Server and C++ Client - C++ Server are similar, and will not
be reproduced here.

A5

Mobile Agent Scenario

During my research many scenarios have been implemented and tested. The following
scenario is given as an example.
Software used:
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•

IBM Aglets Workbench Version 1.0

•

Guardian Firewall Software Version 4.0

The scenario consisted of two mobile agent systems and the firewall between them, see
figure A5.1.

Aglets
Workbench

Aglets
^
^ Workbench

Ji
w

Figure A5.1: Implementing Mobile Agents

The first step consisted in setting up the aglets workbench with a simple example. The
example delivered by IBM has been used.
In the second step, the guardian software has been added. The advantage of this scenario is
that Aglets use the Agent Transfer Protocol (ATP) which works socket-oriented and uses the
sockets 434 or 10434.

Aglets
Workbench

Aglets
Workbench

Figure A5.2: Getting Mobile Agents through a firewall

The Guardian Firewall has been configured to work like a packet filter. It passes the packets
on socket 434 or 10434 through the firewall. This solution works, but it is not able to restrict
or control ATP communication. Therefore a application gateway is needed. Unfortunately, at
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the moment there are no implementation available. This can be implemented using generic
proxies.
CORBA compliant Mobile Agents can use the ORBIX-application gateway provided by
Checkpoint in Firewall-1.

A6

Firewall Solution Implementation

The following software has been used:
•

Orbix 2.3c and the grid -example.

•

Visigenic ORB 3.4

•

Firewall-1 ver. 4.0 from Checkpoint, especially the two ORBIX-application gateways
available.

•

Linux packet filter.

The scenario used is based on the DMZ-scenario described in section 4.1.1.2. It implements a
part of the Intemet-to-Intranet scenario, see figure A6.1.

Figure A6.1: An Intemet-to-Intranet Scenario

Two cases can be distinguished:
•

using the lONAs ORBIX implementation,

•

using Inprises Visigenic ORB implementation.
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Case 1 (Orbix used):
For Orbix-specific communication between the external network and the DMZ, the packet
filter has to allow communication on port 1570 or 1571. These ports are used by the ORBIXdaemon. From the other side, the range from 1590 to 1640 is usually used by different clients.
All the above mentioned ports must be “opened” in a packet filter. However, a better solution
would be to use the ORBlX-application gateway from IONA. Packet Filters have been used
here to demonstrate the occurring problems.
For ORB-specific communication between the DMZ and the internal network Checkpoints
Firewall-1 with the ORBIX-application gateway has been used. In this case there are no
problems to be expected. However, a chain of two firewalls was insurmountable.
Case 2 (Visigenic used):
If Visibroker is used, then the ORBIX-application gateway can not be used. In this case the
Gatekeeper must be used. The best solution in this case is to tunnel HOP through HTTP. The
gatekeeper is able to support this mode.
A problem still remains: Passing packets through a TCP-proxy (filter) is only possible if a
standard port for HOP (port 683) has been defined and implemented.
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